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1. Introduction 
 
Federica Di Marcantonio and Pavel Ciaian 
 
Joint Research Centre, European Commission, Seville, Spain 
 
This report constitutes a compilation of the principal issues raised by the speakers at the 
workshop jointly organised by the Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural 
Development and Joint Research Centre on ‘Unfair trading practices in the food supply 
chain’ held in Brussels between 17-18 July 2017. 
The retail and processing segments of food supply chains have witnessed an increasing 
concentration across Member States (MS) and at global level. A direct consequence of these 
changes is the bargaining power imbalances in trade relations between the actors in the 
chain, potentially leading to unfair trade practices (UTPs). UTPs may occur in particular 
when weak parties have no real alternative to the commercial relation at hand; when one of 
the parties depends on its counterparts due to factors such as technology and know-how; 
when one of the parties can exploit informational advantages to the detriment of the other 
party; in case of incomplete contracts, which leaves room for strategic behaviour during the 
course of the negotiation, execution and finalisation of a contractual relationship. 
The European Commission started to discuss UTPs as a potential problem in the food supply 
chain already in 2009. In 2013, the European Commission adopted the European Retail 
Action Plan and a Green Paper on unfair trading practices in the business-to-business (B2B) 
food and non-food supply chain  (1). The Green Paper makes an initial assessment of the 
problems posed by UTPs in B2B relationships along the food and non-food supply chain, 
including the issue of efficient enforcement of existing national rules and the resulting 
impact on the single market. 
The European Commission defines UTPs as practices that ‘grossly deviate from good 
commercial conduct, are contrary to good faith and fair dealing and are unilaterally imposed 
by one trading partner on another’ (European Commission, 2014). The European 
Commission also acknowledged that UTPs are quite common and may have harmful effects, 
especially on small and medium-sized enterprises in food supply chains. 
The workshop brought together international experts in the field of economic and political 
sciences, who have authored work of relevance for commercial practices in the food supply 
chains with a view to discuss the available scientific literature on methodologies, impacts 
and regulatory aspects of UTPs. The workshop discussions addressed the following four 
topics, and the present report summarises the presentations on them: 
                                          
(
1
) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52013DC0036 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX %3A52013DC0037 
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1. the strengths and weaknesses of methodologies applied in the literature to analyse 
UTPs; 
2. the empirical evidence on the socioeconomic impacts of UTPs; 
3. the regulatory aspects and enforcement costs of UTPs; 
4. the way forward to better understand UTPs in food supply chains. 
The production of this report, following the completion of the workshop, has been the 
responsibility of the JRC. This task has been facilitated through collaboration with five 
internationally recognised experts: Richard J. Sexton, University of California, United States 
(Chapter 2); Jan Fałkowski, University of Warsaw, Poland (Chapter 3); Johan Swinnen and 
Senne Vandevelde, KU Leuven, Belgium (Chapters 4 and 5); and Claude Ménard, Université 
de Paris, France (Chapter 6), acting as rapporteurs for each of the workshop’s four technical 
sessions, whose efforts in capturing the principal issues raised by the presentations in their 
respective sessions has been instrumental towards realisation of this report. This report 
does not pretend to represent a thorough and comprehensive review of scientific literature 
on the topic concerned. The scientific output expressed does not imply a policy position of 
the European Commission. Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on 
behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use that might be made of the information 
contained in this publication. 
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2. Unfair trade practices in the food supply chain: 
defining the problem and the policy issues 
 
 
Richard J. Sexton 
 
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The European Commission defines business-to-business (B2B) unfair trade practices (UTP) 
as ‘practices that grossly deviate from good commercial conduct, are contrary to good faith 
and fair dealing and are unilaterally imposed by one trading partner on another (European 
Commission, 2016)’. Such practices in the food supply chain have become a significant 
concern within the European Community, and have been investigated by several European 
work groups and taskforces in the past few years. In one recent survey, 96 % of suppliers in 
the EU food chain reported that they had been subjected to at least one form of UTP 
(European Commission, 2014). 
The common focus of discussions regarding UTPs is farmer interactions with their 
downstream buyers. The concern is that increasing concentration and consolidation among 
food manufacturers and retailers has reduced potential trading partners for many farmers 
to only one or a few. These settings may create significant imbalances of bargaining power 
in the food supply chain between contracting parties and promote implementation of UTPs. 
In the words of the Agricultural Markets Task Force (AMTF) (2016): ‘Such imbalances may 
encourage certain behavioural practices on the part of the stronger party in a given 
commercial relationship or transaction’. 
UTPs between retailers and processors can also be important, and farmers themselves may 
also engage in UTPs, for example, by shirking on the quality of production as a way to 
reduce cost — the classic adverse selection problem (Swinnen and Vandeplas, 2010, 2011; 
Fałkowski, 2017). UTPs are widely believed to adversely impact market outcomes. A first 
consideration is regarding the distribution of welfare and the likelihood that a buyer-
imposed UTP reduces supplier welfare and creates gains that are retained by market 
intermediaries and not transmitted forward to consumers (Gorton, Lemke, and Alfarsi (GLA) 
2017). 
In addition to concerns about equity within the supply chain, a further concern is that UTPs 
lead to inefficiency, create uncertainty and stifle innovation and investment (AMTF, 2016; 
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GLA, 2017). UTPs may drive firms to exit a market and/or inhibit the entry of firms (AMTF, 
2016; GLA, 2017). Further, because of the network effects, implementation of UTPs may 
lead to more UTPs based on competitive pressure or establishment of industry norms. 
This paper sets forth B2B practices that have been identified as UTPs by the various authors 
and commissions that have studied the issue. It next considers conceptual and empirical 
approaches for studying UTPs and generating evidence on the occurrence of UTPs. The 
paper next moves to setting forth economic principles to gird the discussion of UTPs before 
turning to the challenge of setting effective policies to address UTPs in the food supply 
chain. 
 
2.2. Defining B2B UTP in the food supply chain 
Considerable attention has been given to B2B UTP in recent years, especially within the 
European Union. Identification of UTP has been made more difficult by the fact that the 
economics literature does not provide a solid theoretical foundation for defining and 
analysing B2B UTPs (Sexton, 2017). Instead, the focus on unfair practices has been on anti-
competitive practices among rivals at the same stage of the supply chain, or deceptive and 
unfair marketing practices towards customers. 
An early effort to develop a list of UTPs was undertaken by several core members of the B2B 
Platform, as part of the Supply Chain Initiative (2011). These behaviours included: 
— refusing to put specific terms in writing; 
— imposing general terms and conditions that contain unfair clauses; 
— unilaterally terminating a commercial relationship with no notice or unreasonably 
short notice or without objectively justified reason; 
— contractual sanctions that are applied in a non-transparent manner and are 
disproportionate to damages suffered; 
— sanctions imposed without any justification in the agreement or applicable law; 
— non-contractual retroactive unilateral changes in the cost/price of products/services; 
— withholding essential information/revealing sensitive information; 
— transfer of unjustified or disproportionate risk to a contracting party; 
— imposing a requirement to fund the cost of a promotion; 
— preventing a contracting party from making legitimate marketing and promotional 
claims on their products; 
— imposing listing (slotting) fees that are disproportionate to the risk incurred in 
stocking a new product; 
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— tying — imposing on a contracting party the purchase or supply of products or 
services tied to another set of products or services. 
The European Commission conducted a rigorous investigation of B2B UTP in its 2013 Green 
Paper on the subject and identified the following categories of UTPs (European Commission, 
2013): 
— a trading partner’s retroactive misuse of unspecified, ambiguous or incomplete 
contract terms; 
— a trading partner’s excessive and unpredictable transfer of costs and risks to its 
counterparty; 
— a trading partner’s use of confidential information; 
— the unfair termination or disruption of a commercial relationship. 
The AMTF (2016) provided a more succinct list of examples of practices that it considered to 
be unfair: 
— unduly late payments (the EU late payments directive specifies maximum of 60 
days); 
— unfair shifting of business risk to the other party; 
— unilateral or retroactive changes to contracts; 
— unfair termination of contracts, including termination on short notice. 
UTPs were further elaborated by the European Commission in a 2016 report to the 
European Parliament wherein the Commission set forth several behaviours that it regarded 
as inconsistent with good commercial practice (European Commission, 2016): 
— one party unduly or unfairly shifting its own costs or risks to the other party; 
— one party asking the other party for advantages or benefits without performing a 
service related to the advantage or benefit; 
— retroactive or unilateral changes to a contract, unless the contract allows for it under 
fair conditions; 
— unfair termination of a contractual relationship or unjustified threat of termination. 
Most recently, GLA (2017) identified the following examples of UTPs based on a 
comprehensive review of supply chain literature: 
— unexpected costs and deductions; 
— delayed or no payment; 
— frequent and unilateral changes in prices/compensation by the buyer; 
— bundling of purchases with additional services by a retail buyer; 
— requiring the supplier to pay for shrinkage at the retail level (which may include 
thefts of the product); 
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— unfair use of information including failure to respect confidentiality; 
— imposition of territorial supply constraints. 
Sexton (2017) noted that another way to think of UTP is to define their converse, namely 
what would be considered good business practices. The Supply Chain Initiative project 
(2011) set forth a list of such practices that included the following: 
— use of written agreements; 
— no unilateral changes in contract terms; 
— confidential information is not be revealed or misused; 
— all parties bear their own risk; 
— agreements are complied with; 
— no use of threats to obtain unjustified advantage. 
Based upon his analysis of the work of these prior bodies, Sexton (2017) identified the 
following four consensus categories of B2B UTP: 
— excessive shifting of risks; 
— unilateral changes in contract terms; 
— unfair termination of contracts or commercial relationships, including abrupt 
termination and termination without justification; 
— unfair shifting of costs and levying of charges. 
However, in evaluating the prior work to define and identify B2B UTP, Sexton (2017) noted 
that many of the indicated practices were imprecisely and ambiguously defined. In some 
instances, the behaviours identified as exemplary of UTPs include the term ‘unfair’ itself or 
contain other similarly ambiguous terms such as ‘excessive,’ ‘unpredictable,’ ‘unduly,’ and 
‘unjustified.’ Sexton (2017) suggested that this ambiguity makes it difficult to promulgate 
regulations to proscribe UTPs, and for firms to know if specific practices would be 
considered UTPs. He further expressed the concern that ambiguity in defining and clearly 
understanding what practices would be penalised under regulations imposed to proscribe 
UTPs would raise transactions costs and reduce the likelihood that mutually beneficial 
transactions would take place. 
In contrast to the significant concerns about UTP within the EU, they have attracted 
relatively little attention elsewhere (Fałkowski, 2017; Sexton, 2017), raising the question of 
the degree to which UTPs are a universal phenomenon or limited to a few countries and 
regions. In the United States, focus on UTPs has largely been limited to the livestock 
industries, where a unique regulatory structure exists due to the passage in 1922 of the 
Packers and Stockyards Act (PSA). The PSA gives regulatory authority over the livestock 
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industries to the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) (2). In 2010, the USDA promulgated a 
set of regulations under the PSA intended to restrict contracting practices in the livestock 
industries. The proposed regulations did not speak specifically of UTPs but their clear 
purpose was to restrict contracting practices considered by the USDA to be unfair. They 
included: 
— paying premiums or discounts on contracts without written justification for them; 
— restricting tournament-style payment systems (3); 
— limiting buyers’ ability to require capital investments by suppliers (4). 
In contrast, the policy concern in the US is about the market power of food-chain 
intermediaries as buyers of agricultural products and their ability to suppress prices to 
farmers, below the marginal value product of the farm input. Sexton (2017) noted that 
simply depressing the farm price below marginal value product as a consequence of 
monopsony or oligopsony power was not among the practices identified as a UTP in the 
aforementioned literature. 
 
2.3. Methodological approaches to analyse the occurrence and 
impact of UTPs 
The examples of UTP set forth in the prior section comprise a heterogeneous set of actions 
that occur at different stages of a transaction, making it difficult to develop a 
comprehensive and inclusive theory or model of UTPs in the supply chain (GLA, 2017). In 
their review of the literature regarding B2B UTP, GLA (2017) identified three main 
methodological approaches applied in the literature to analyse UTPs including: (i) 
transactions-cost economics (Weaver and Dickson, 1998, Bhattacharya et al., 2015), (ii) 
asymmetric power and bilateral deterrence theory (Kumar et al., 1995) (5), and (iii) 
relationship marketing (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). 
The transactions-cost framework emphasises that frequency of exchange, uncertainty 
surrounding the exchange and asset specificity of a trading partner all influence the 
likelihood of UTP occurrence, with frequent exchanges and long-lived relationships making 
UTPs less likely, while uncertainty, asset specificity, and supplier lock-in make them more 
likely. GLA (2017) emphasised that, although asymmetric power and bilateral deterrence 
theory has not been extensively applied to the food supply chain, it provides useful lessons 
                                          
(
2
) Antitrust enforcement in the US is held jointly by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). These 
federal agencies retain authority over the livestock industries, so the authority exercised by the USDA via the PSA is in addition to 
the enforcement powers held by the DOJ and FTC.  
(
3
) Tournament payment systems base a farmer’s pay on his/her performance relative to a group of peers. They have been used 
commonly in broiler contracts in the US. 
(
4
) These proposed regulations were highly controversial and to date not been implemented. In addition, some US states have 
attempted to implement legislation to restrict contracting practices in livestock industries. However, US courts have invalidated 
many of these regulations.  
(
5
) Other examples of this framework include Benton and Maloni (2005), Hingley (2005), Nyaga et al. (2013), Maglaras et al. (2015), and 
Cuevas et al. (2015). 
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to better understand UTPs. Likelihood of UTPs is reduced when transacting parties have 
symmetric bargaining power. Imbalances of power reduce the impediments to the more 
powerful firm acting opportunistically by implementing UTPs. 
The third methodological framework, relationship marketing, is based on the seminal work 
of Morgan and Hunt (1994) and draws inspiration from transactions cost economics and 
power theories. UTPs result in reduced relationship commitment because suppliers believe 
they cannot trust their trading partners. 
Empirical methodologies 
In general, there are substantial gaps in the academic literature on UTPs in food supply 
chains, making the scale of the problem difficult to assess. Based on their review of 
literature, GLA (2017) cited a lack of verified evidence on (i) occurrence of most types of 
UTPs, (ii) prevalence of UTPs in transnational settings, (iii) whether UTPs are more common 
in the food supply chain than in other sectors such as construction, and (iv) the impacts on 
producers and consumers of specific laws designed to curtail the use of UTPs. 
Although the source of information on most reported UTPs is suppliers themselves, GLA 
(2017) suggests that one reason for the paucity of evidence is suppliers’ reluctance to report 
UTPs for fear of retaliation or delisting by buyers. They identify four main empirical 
approaches to investigate possible cases of UTPs in the food supply chain: 
— interpretive methodologies based on interviews; 
— surveys, either online, by phone, or face to face; 
— case studies; 
— modelling. 
GLA (2017) regard interpretive methodologies as appropriate to understanding human 
motivations and interactions, but argue that the knowledge generated is socially situated 
and difficult to extrapolate to other contexts. Generalisability is also a key concern also with 
case studies. Surveys by contrast enable a cross-section of settings to be investigated and 
thus offer greater opportunity to generalise, but, when applied to analysis of UTPs, are 
inherently limited because typically only the perspective of one party to a transaction is 
recorded. GLA regard modelling as a methodology that can support investigations that 
cannot be addressed by the other methods, but warn that generalisation beyond the 
parameters specified in the model must be done cautiously. 
GLA (2017) provide several examples drawn from the popular press or from the Groceries 
Code Adjudicator (GCA), of what were believed UTPs implemented by European grocery 
retailers. The GCA is an agency of the UK government put in place to investigate and 
adjudicate trade disputes involving food retailers in Britain. The examples include the 
following: 
— retailer Holland and Barrett requiring suppliers to reduce costs by 5 % and 
contribute to the company’s costs; 
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— Britain’s Tesco being accused of delaying payment to suppliers as a way of 
enforcing leverage over them to accept harsher contract terms; 
— retailer Aldi being accused of delaying payment to suppliers beyond the 30 days 
specified in the applicable law; 
— Wm Morrison supermarkets requesting lump-sum retroactive payments from 
suppliers in violation of the UK’s Groceries Code. 
Gorton et al. (2015) represents one of the only econometric modelling studies directly 
relevant to UTPs. The authors studied the determinants of buyer trustworthiness (and thus, 
inverse likelihood of buyers engaging in UTPs) for the Armenian dairy sector. This study set 
forth several hypotheses regarding the determinants of trustworthiness. It was predicted to 
be a positive function of (i) the number of commercial buyers, (ii) the ease of farmers’ costs 
of switching among buyers, (iii) the size of the supplier, and (iv) the supplier’s membership 
in a marketing cooperative. Hypothesised to be negatively related to buyer trustworthiness 
was (v) buyers’ ease of switching among suppliers. In terms of outcomes, buyers’ 
trustworthiness was hypothesised to be positively related to suppliers’ (i) satisfaction, (ii) 
production volume, and (iii) product quality. Results of their econometric analysis found 
support for each of the hypotheses. 
 
2.4. Economic principles regarding B2B UTP 
Sexton (2017) proposes the broad principle that economic agents participating in a 
transaction have the incentive to pursue two goals: first, to maximise the gains associated 
with the transaction (i.e. the size of the pie) and, second, to capture as large a share of the 
gains from that transaction as possible. This second objective could be moderated by long-
term considerations, in particular concern about the financial viability of a valued trading 
partner (e.g., Crespi, Saitone, and Sexton, 2012). These two goals could conflict with each 
other in the sense that a trading partner’s actions to increase its share of the surplus 
associated with a transaction could decrease the magnitude of the surplus (Sexton, 2017). 
This latter point is, of course, a key concern regarding UTPs. 
Sexton (2017) questions why trading partners would engage in practices that reduce 
efficiencies and attenuate trading partners’ incentives to make investments, given that such 
actions reduce the gains to a transaction. As noted, one answer could be that the UTP 
enables the trading partner to capture a larger share of the diminished surplus and gain a 
net advantage in the process. Sexton (2017), however, questions the likelihood of such 
occurrences, because the available contract pricing mechanisms would ordinarily enable the 
trading partner with a bargaining-power advantage to extract surplus to a transaction 
without imposing UTPs that diminish the surplus associated with the transaction (6). 
                                          
(
6
) For example, this may occur with two-part tariff pricing wherein a supplier is paid the marginal value product of her input to ensure 
the efficient rate of output and then economic surplus was extracted by an access fee, such as a slotting allowance. Similarly, a 
contract can specify that a supplier produce the rate of output that maximises the surplus associated with a transaction in return for 
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Two specific practices that are commonly included on lists of UTPs: unfair shifting of costs 
and transfers of risks to a trading partner serve to illustrate this point. If a cost is transferred 
to a party that is the less efficient bearer of that cost, it reduces the surplus to a transaction, 
and, accordingly, would not be done unless a trading partner had no other means to extract 
surplus from a transaction. As to risk bearing, a standard result in the principal-agent 
literature that the entity most capable of bearing risk (namely, the less risk-averse partner) 
should bear most or all of the risk to a transaction in order to maximise the surplus 
associated with the transaction (Sexton, 2017). The only qualifier to this result is that 
removing risk from a trading partner by guaranteeing a fixed payment may create incentive 
compatibility issues (Grossman and Hart, 1983). 
Sexton (2017) also questions the conclusion of the AMTF that UTP could cause the exit of 
otherwise viable enterprises, asking whether it is in the best long-term interests of a 
business to drive its trading partners from the marketplace? Even if other suppliers could 
potentially take the place of suppliers who exited the market, they likely would not be as 
valuable as the original trading partners, and reputational effects from a firm’s use of UTP 
would naturally make other firms reluctant to engage in trade with it. Such reputational 
effects can spill over, both downstream towards the final consumer and upstream towards 
suppliers (GLA, 2017). 
Finally, Sexton (2017) challenged the belief that B2B UTPs were more likely to occur as a 
result of consolidation and rising concentration in the food chain. He argued that under 
certain market conditions, increasing concentration and consolidation results in more 
efficient outcomes and better results for farmers than loosely concentrated market 
structures (see for example Crespi, Saitone and Sexton, 2012; Sexton, 2013; Adjemien, 
Saitone and Sexton, 2016; Mérel and Sexton, 2017). 
The key economic argument underlying this view is that buyer actions that diminish payoffs 
to farmers, whether through UTP or by paying prices below marginal value product, reduce 
the return on farmer investment below the level needed to insure the supplier’s financial 
viability. The exit of suppliers, however, is detrimental to the long-run profit of the buyers, 
who themselves have substantial sunk investments and need to acquire farm product 
proximate to their processing and shipping facilities in order to operate them at efficient 
capacity (7). Similarly, buyers who produce differentiated products to sell downstream need 
to acquire farm-product input with quality characteristics suited to producing the desired 
final product. As procurement markets become more concentrated, buyers are better able 
to internalise the benefits of paying returns sufficient to insure the financial viability of their 
suppliers. This leads to the seemingly paradoxical result that more highly concentrated 
                                                                                                                                 
a fixed payment that meets the supplier’s participation constraint but transfers most of the transaction’s surplus to the buyer 
(Sexton, 2017). 
(
7
) However, it might be argued that suppliers lost through engaging in UTPs or paying below-market prices can simply be replaced by 
other suppliers in a setting where there are many farmers and only a few buyers. Such arguments, however, presume that 
agricultural products and producers are homogeneous in respect to product quality, location of production, timing of production, 
etc. In modern agricultural markets, these presumptions are unlikely to be correct, so if preferred suppliers are driven from the 
market, it will likely be to the long-term detriment of the buyer. 
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procurement markets can be better for farmers, and UTPs, whatever the likelihood of them 
occurring in general, are less likely to occur as procurement markets become more 
concentrated. 
 
2.5. Challenges in setting policies to regulate and remedy UTPs 
Several challenges confront policy-makers and regulators in designing market interventions 
to limit UTPs and prescribing penalties for firms committing them. First is the difficulty 
already noted inherent in identifying UTPs. Actions that distribute market surplus in favour 
of one agent over another do not represent UTPs unless there is an inherent ‘unfairness’ in 
the action (Fałkowski, 2017). It is often difficult to distinguish UTPs from what might be 
considered normal competitive behaviour (8). 
Also of concern is the manner in which firms and markets would react to policies and 
regulations that proscribe behaviour considered to represent UTP and how these responses 
could impact costs, prices and innovation in the supply chain (Fałkowski, 2017). Attempts to 
ban practices deemed as unfair could raise transactions costs and diminish the efficiency of 
production — a case of the cure possibly being worse than the disease (Sexton, 2017). 
Further, stringent regulations to ban UTPs could cause the shifting of production to 
countries with less-stringent regulations. In addition, assistance factors (benefits in addition 
to price) often provided by downstream buyers to their agricultural product suppliers may 
be impacted by regulations of UTPs. Business relationships could disappear in instances 
where they were dependent on practices banned as UTPs (Fałkowski, 2017). All of these 
factors create uncertainty as to how regulations to limit or ban UTPs will impact the incomes 
of farmers, the intended primary beneficiary of the policies. 
In essence, effective enforcement of UTP policies faces the challenge of limiting two types of 
errors: (i) failing to proscribe actions that do constitute welfare-reducing UTPs, i.e. too-lax 
enforcement or type I error; and (ii) proscribing practices or contract provisions that actually 
increase economic efficiency and social welfare — too rigid enforcement, or type II error. 
How to strike this proper balance represents an unanswered question in the literature, but 
in the views of Fałkowski (2017) and Sexton (2017), typical enforcement policies are likely to 
err in the direction of type II. 
Various formal mechanisms might be used in addressing the problem of UTPs, including 
greater use of written contracts. It is widely believed that specifying agreements in writing 
through contracts represents an antidote for UTP and indeed written agreements are the 
first recommendation of good practices by the Supply Chain Initiative (2011). However, 
                                          
(
8
) Fałkowski (2017) offers the delay in payment to a supplier, something widely acknowledged to be a UTP, to illustrate the ambiguity 
in defining UTPs and establishing policies to prevent them. He noted three scenarios: (1) firm A (e.g., a processor) delays payment to 
firm B (e.g. a farmer) as a means of acquiring free credit; (2) firm A delays payment to firm B due to A’s own financial stress; and (3) 
A delays payment to B because A has not been paid by its downstream buyer. Fałkowski noted that most people would regard (1) as 
a UTP, but that few would consider (3) as representing improper behaviour. 
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UTPs can still occur in the presence of contracts, which will inevitably be incomplete and 
imperfectly enforced (Fałkowski, 2017). Sexton (2017) makes a similar point in reporting on 
agricultural contracts in the United States, which in general are not highly detailed and are 
often just a page or two in length. Rather than attempt to specify all possible contract 
contingencies, a dispute-resolution mechanism, generally binding arbitration, is specified 
instead. 
The difficulties in defining which B2B practices constitute UTPs instead of ordinary 
competitive behaviour intended to promote transaction efficiency led Sexton (2017) to 
recommend adoption of a ‘rule of reason’ regulatory approach, similar to the standard 
applied to much of US antitrust law. Proscribing behaviours that are efficiency enhancing 
will reduce the surplus to a transaction and likely harm both parties to it, making it 
imperative that regulatory bodies do not incorrectly identify such behaviours as UTPs. 
Sexton (2017) proposed specific criteria for adjudicating a rule-of-reason standard. The first 
criterion would be whether the alleged action had a clear efficiency motivation. Second, 
investigatory bodies should examine if simpler means than the alleged UTP were available 
to the accused party to extract economic surplus, A third criterion is to ask if the business 
relationship in question is likely to be long term, with it being unlikely that a business would 
disrupt a long-term relationship by engaging in UTP (Sexton, 2017). 
Other authors have emphasised the role of informal mechanism to reign in UTPs. Fałkowski 
(2017) poses the question of whether UTPs are a short-run phenomenon in the sense that 
they will be reduced or eliminated in the long-run by competitive pressures. If this were 
true, it would reduce the imperative to develop policies to regulate such behaviour and 
policies to encourage market entry could help reduce UTPs by facilitating competition 
(Fałkowski, 2017). 
Both GLA (2017) and Fałkowski (2017) recognise the importance of network effects — the 
extent to which firms’ actions are influenced by their competitors — in regulating the 
occurrence of UTPs. If UTPs yield a competitive advantage, rivals might be forced to follow 
suit to remain competitive (9). But in a similar manner, remedies to UTPs could also spread 
through a supply chain, thereby reducing enforcement costs. 
Interpersonal relationships between buyers and sellers may also influence the incidence of 
UTPs (Fałkowski, 2017). Informal and long-lasting ties between buyers and sellers could 
mitigate the problem of UTPs and thus, such informal institutions can represent one answer 
to UTPs. (10) But little evidence had been brought to bear on this point. GLA (2017) note that 
many retailers specifically seek to avoid the occurrence of such relationships by frequently 
transferring buyers to different commodity groups. 
                                          
(
9
) Fałkowski (2017) analogised UTPs to technological innovations in that they create a competitive advantage for the first adopter and 
thereby effectively force rivals to follow suit. 
(
10
) This emphasis on long-term relationships is consistent with the claim of Sexton (2017) that UTPs are unlikely in situations when 
economic agents value the future and do not heavily discount future benefits and costs. 
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Similar to GLA (2017), Fałkowski (2017) argues that informal sanctions and social norms or 
‘community-based mechanisms’ could be effective in restraining the use of UTPs, but there 
are several unanswered questions about how such mechanisms would work and what is 
needed for them to be most effective. The role of social norms is more important, the 
weaker the contract enforcement. A related point raised by Fałkowski (2017) is that public 
regulations of UTPs could in essence have a crowding-out effect wherein private actions by 
farmers to improve their bargaining power (e.g. through a marketing cooperative) are 
substituted by state action. 
 
2.6. Conclusions 
The issue of UTPs in the food supply chain has assumed considerable importance within the 
European Union, and the subject has been analysed extensively by the European 
Commission and task forces operating under its auspices. The concern is that UTPs are on 
the ascent in the food chain due to increasing concentration and consolidation among 
market intermediaries and, further, that their use will harm farmers and small-scale 
marketing firms operating in the food chain, cause market inefficiencies, curtail investment 
and, in the most severe cases, cause the exit of otherwise viable enterprises. 
This paper hopes to contribute to this discussion through examining and evaluating the 
practices commonly considered to be UTPs and considering policy alternatives. In 
considering practices that have been designated as UTPs, the paper highlights a concern 
that the indicated actions are imprecisely and ambiguously defined, such that developing 
actionable policies to proscribe them would be very challenging. A further concern is that 
policies to limit UTPs could eliminate practices that enhance efficiency of transactions and 
thereby reduce the total surplus that can be divided between participants to the 
transaction. In the same sense, the concern that business arrangements will be branded as 
UTPs may cause firms to forego otherwise beneficial transactions. Thus, policies to address 
UTPs could have adverse unintended consequences in an environment where UTPs and 
their consequences are poorly understood. 
This paper also highlighted conceptual and empirical approaches to studying UTPs, but also 
noted the paucity of evidence to date on the occurrence of UTPs in general and in particular 
within the food supply chain. The limited knowledge accumulated to date on UTPs despite 
the considerable public interest in the topic suggests the imperative for additional research 
be conducted on the topic. 
In hoping to add to our knowledge base regarding UTPs, this paper has developed some of 
the underlying economics regarding UTPs and the settings in which they are more or less 
likely to occur. This analysis posed a challenge to the oft-held beliefs that UTPs that create 
market inefficiencies will be implemented and, moreover, are more likely to occur as 
industries become more highly concentrated. 
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Finally, the analysis concluded by addressing the policy challenges surrounding UTPs, given 
the difficulties in rigorously defining them and the paucity of conceptual and empirical 
evidence to provide a foundation for policy setting. Given these difficulties and the risk that 
policies can have unintended consequences that harm to the very parties intended to be 
beneficiaries of policies, it was suggested that any adjudication of UTPs should be conducted 
under a rule-of-reason criterion. Specific guidelines for implementing such an approach 
were suggested. The paper also raised the prospect that UTPs could be constrained through 
means other than direct regulation. Informal relationships, network effects, competitive 
market pressures, and long-run considerations may limit UTPs in the absence of formal 
regulations, with the fear being that formal regulations may ‘crowd out’ less formal means 
of addressing UTPs. 
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3.1. Introduction 
Unfair trading practices (UTPs) have become an important reference point both in political 
debates as well as in academic research. Several concerns have been expressed that UTPs 
may result in outcomes which are undesirable from the point of view of the whole society 
(see for example, European Commission, 2014). In consequence, the presence of UTPs is 
often argued to be a good reason for government intervention and serves as a justification 
for some precautionary or remedial measures. 
Clearly, many of the arguments that are used to support this view are difficult to refute. 
Moreover, very often they are in line with intuition. Yet, it should be emphasised that our 
understanding of the impact of UTPs is still very limited. As this chapter tries to illustrate, 
characterising and quantifying the effects of UTPs is not an easy task. This is in large part 
due to the fact that UTPs involve many nuances that frequently fall outside the existing 
definitions and therefore elude easy assessments. Further, UTPs may exert a profound 
influence on many (interrelated) aspects of the functioning of the agri-food supply chain. In 
addition, the likely effects (including those concerning the aggregate value added created in 
within-chain transactions or the distribution of gains from these transactions along the 
different levels of the supply chain) are non-trivial. 
This chapter aims at summarising two presentations — Dries (2017) and Russo et al. (2017) 
— that provide key insights with respect to the theoretical and empirical works focusing on 
the impacts of UTPs in the agri-food supply chain. The former presentation is devoted to 
study the impacts of UTPs on farmers (Dries, 2017). The other presentation in turn, focuses 
on the impacts of UTPs on consumers (Russo et al., 2017). 
Interestingly, even though the two presentations concentrate on different stages of the 
supply chain, they share several similarities. This is of importance, as it clearly shows that 
there are at least a couple of issues, often quite fundamental ones, that policy-
makers/researchers will need to tackle no matter what stage of the agri-food supply chain 
they are concerned with. The most important common thread running through both 
21 
speeches related to the fact that our understanding of UTPs, notwithstanding the growing 
interest expressed by both policy-makers and researchers, is still very imperfect. One reason 
for that is that there are still many unknowns which have not been covered by the research. 
The other reason for why we have only limited knowledge on UTPs is that the evidence we 
do have does not allow us to draw unambiguous conclusions. The findings from the existing 
studies are very heterogeneous and not very robust. 
While many reasons could be provided to account for that, it seems that the following 
problems play a key role. First, UTPs comprise very broad categories of practices and the 
existing definitions often do not provide a sharp delineation of what should be called UTPs 
and what should not. Second, UTPs are seldom used one by one and instead, they often 
turn up in a whole package. This makes it very challenging to establish what should be 
attributed to a specific practice and what might be driven by a different practice. We also 
have a very limited knowledge about potential synergy effects between these practices. 
Third, even practices which are commonly considered as UTPs are difficult to measure. 
What follows is that the available data are imperfect. This is because a lot of important 
information is private and companies involved in UTPs are not willing to reveal it. Therefore, 
there is an urgent need for increasing transparency within the agri-food supply chain. This 
would be of great importance for both policy-makers and researchers. Another recurring 
theme of both presentations is related to the fact that establishing causal relationships 
between UTPs and some observed effects is very difficult because of the presence of a great 
many confounding factors (endogenous changes in costs along the chain, seasonal 
variations, some exogenous shocks, etc.). 
Below, we provide some further insights on these challenges and explain in more detail 
their origins and potential consequences. We also report basic findings from the literature 
on the (potential) impacts of UTPs. We first present the discussion on the impacts of UTPs 
on farmers. In the next step, we discuss the impacts of UTPs on consumers. The chapter 
ends with some concluding remarks. 
 
3.2. Economic impacts of UTPs on farmers 
Even though there has been a lot of research on agri-food supply chains, including many 
studies specifically focusing on farmers’ relationships with representatives of downstream 
sectors (Reardon and Timmer, 2007; Swinnen, 2007), the evidence on the impacts of UTPs 
on farmers is mostly anecdotal and largely based on case studies. More systematic evidence 
instead is very limited. 
That being said, two strands of the literature should be recognised which may provide some 
insights on the issue in question, at least in an indirect way. The first line of research aims at 
highlighting the process of price formation along the agri-food supply chain (Meyer and von 
Cramon-Taubadel, 2004; Vavra and Goodwin, 2005; Lloyd et al., 2006; Assefa et al., 2014; 
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Bakucs et al., 2014). The focus here is on improving our understanding of the nature of price 
movements along the various stages of the agri-food chain and to analyse the magnitude, 
direction and speed with which price movements are transmitted from farm to processing 
and retail levels or the other way around. When trying to explain the documented price 
behaviour, this type of study often refers to the issue of market power which is commonly 
linked to UTPs (see below). The latter, however, are not analysed explicitly. As a result, this 
line of research can be informative about the role of UTPs only in an indirect way. The 
second strand of the literature relates to the problem of delayed payments (see for 
example, Gow et al., 2000; Gorton and White, 2007). Given that delayed payments are often 
mentioned as an example of UTPs, these studies may provide more direct evidence on the 
influence of UTPs on farmers. What should be noted though is that delayed payments are 
only one among many practices considered as being unfair. Further, the question arises as 
to what extent the evidence from the existing studies exhaust the topic. Importantly, the 
received works rarely focus on the current situation in the EU and mostly draw on past 
experience from transition countries (Gow and Swinnen, 1998; Dries and Swinnen, 2004; 
2010; Gorton and White, 2007; Dries et al., 2009). What follows is a question arises as to 
what extent the findings these studies provide reflect regularities that are specific only to 
the transition context and thus to what extent they can be generalised. These reservations 
need to be kept in mind when interpreting the existing evidence. 
Typically, UTPs are associated with the way in which power is distributed along the agri-food 
supply chain. More specifically, an imbalanced distribution of power between parties 
involved in agri-food transactions is often mentioned as a crucial element which is behind 
UTPs or that creates the room for using UTPs (European Commission, 2014). The existing 
literature offers two distinct perspectives on the role of power in this context. On the one 
hand, the focus might be on the regulatory framework that provides rules which affect the 
level of competition in food markets (McCorriston, 2002; 2013). From this angle, the 
analysis is mainly concerned with competition-related issues and identifying the degree of 
market power of dominant players. In addition, a lot of attention has been paid to study the 
consequences that the presence of market power may potentially bring about not only for 
farmers, but also for consumer welfare as a whole (Sexton, 2013; Sexton and Lavoie, 2001; 
Sheldon and Sperling, 2003). Further, this perspective highlights how the governance of the 
agri-food supply chain could be potentially affected by changes in competition law. 
On the other hand, the issue of power within the supply chain can be investigated from the 
bargaining power perspective. Here, the focus is not so much on the competition law and 
the presence of market power, but on the contracts that are signed between transacting 
parties. In line with this approach, the party that is to gain the most from being involved in a 
contract (measured by the difference between the value to be gained in the contract and 
the value to be gained outside the contract) is the weakest and has less bargaining power 
than the others. This perspective takes into account the fact that UTPs may not necessarily 
be related to the presence of market power. Indeed, various forms of unfair trading 
23 
practices may take place irrespectively of whether a given firm (or a limited number of 
firms) can exert market power or not (European Commission, 2014; Mc Corriston, 2013; 
Sexton, 2013). 
While these two perspectives differ with regard to the emphasis they put on various aspects 
of the analysis, for both of them the key elements that create the potential for using UTPs 
are to some extent similar. This becomes clear when one recognises that both of these 
approaches point to the fact that parties characterised by inelastic supply, parties incurring 
high sunk costs, parties having high switching costs (i.e. high costs of finding an alternative 
contractor); parties facing high assets specificity (i.e. the situation in which the value of 
using a given asset outside the relationship is much lower than the value of using it within 
the relationship) may face high risks of being in the situation in which their contractors will 
abuse their position and use UTPs. 
UTPs may happen at each stage of the agri-food chain. Further, their effects can be 
transmitted along the chain towards either downstream or upstream sectors. That being 
said, the focus in the literature is often on upstream suppliers. In this context, it is typically 
argued that UTPs may bring about potentially negative effects for farmers. Moreover, it is 
commonly believed that these negative consequences may take different forms and affect 
different aspects of farm decision-making processes. A particular emphasis is put on the 
following issues. Firstly, it is often argued that UTPs may importantly determine the way 
prices are negotiated and set. This obviously will translate into how farm revenues are 
shaped, as well as into costs that farmers need to incur. What follows is that UTPs may play 
an important role in determining farm profits. Secondly, it is suggested that UTPs may 
contribute to an increased market uncertainty. This in turn will impact farmers’ investment 
decisions and therefore limit the room for innovations. As a result, at the aggregate level, 
this will influence the competitiveness of the sector as a whole. Further, by affecting 
production decisions, UTPs may also potentially lead to exits of some suppliers. In this 
context, it is commonly assumed that small-scale farmers are most vulnerable to this 
unfavourable outcome. 
These arguments obviously call for an adequate regulatory framework that would help to 
address these negative aspects. In this respect, one typically refers to formal rules that 
would provide correct incentives, in order to discourage transacting parties from using 
UTPs. What needs to be stressed though is that there is relatively little quantitative 
evidence that would allow for verifying whether the assumed negative consequences 
mentioned above indeed take place. There is equally little knowledge about the (likely) 
effects of potential (legal) responses to UTPs. For example, it is not clear whether 
regulations designed to fight against UTPs would not create new problems and 
inefficiencies. An additional issue is that even in the presence of the regulatory framework 
correctly identifying UTPs, transacting parties may not be willing to take advantage of it 
being afraid of losing long-term relationships with their contractors. What follows is that 
even though there might exist good reasons for state intervention, caution should be 
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exercised before assuming that what we propose in response to UTPs will lead to the 
intended effects. 
The existing evidence on the impacts of UTPs on farmers is largely anecdotal and is based on 
some cases in which farmers have been exposed to UTPs. Lack of systematic evidence in this 
respect is largely driven by two issues. One of them relates to the problem of measurement. 
Indeed, it is very difficult to measure precisely the phenomenon under study and identify 
how to use the available data to exactly capture the impact of a given UTP. This is well 
illustrated with the example of studies using price data. The latter are relatively easily 
available and of reasonably good quality. What follows is one can try to establish relatively 
robust evidence on price movements along the agri-food chain. Yet, we are still far from 
understanding what drives the observed patterns of price adjustments and why (Bakucs et 
al., 2014). This also clearly indicates the second key point which explains the lack of 
systematic evidence on the impacts of UTPs, namely the problem of attribution. As there 
are many confounding factors, it is very challenging to pinpoint the extent to which a given 
phenomenon (for example, farm exits) is due to UTPs or rather due to some other things 
happening (for example, specific state regulations or idiosyncratic risks faced by an 
individual or by a group of farm households). 
Studies focusing on price formation typically try to identify the share that farmers have in 
total expenditures on food or alternatively the share that they have in the total value added 
created in food production. According to the existing evidence provided for the US (based 
on the data from USDA Economic Research Service), in 2015 this share amounted to 15.6 % 
and has been decreasing over recent decades. Some perceive this as evidence supporting 
the claim that the position of farmers in the agri-food supply chain has been deteriorating. 
Yet, the question remains whether this development is not due to other factors taking 
place. If, for example, food is more and more processed, the declining share of farmers in 
the value added is not that surprising. 
Other studies focusing on the processes of price formation are devoted to the issue of price 
transmission. Overall, it is expected that price movements threatening the margin of firms 
being able to exert market power are transmitted faster than price movements that 
improve it. This seems to be consistent with patterns of price behaviour at different stages 
of the agri-food supply chain which could have been observed during the recent financial 
crisis. According to the data from Eurostat spanning the period (January 2007-July 2009), 
agricultural commodity prices reacted more strongly and more quickly to what has been 
happening in the aftermath of financial crisis than prices at the other stages of the agri-food 
supply chain. The reaction of processor prices and retail prices instead was more gradual 
and weaker. Similar observations arise when one looks at the evolution of prices measured 
for different stages of the agri-food supply chain over the longer horizon. As indicated by 
the analysis undertaken by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in the period 2004-2014, 
agricultural commodity prices tend to be characterised by stronger volatility than consumer 
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prices (OECD/FAO, 2015; OECD, 2015). What is also often found in the literature is that the 
pass-through of price increases is different from the pass-through of price decreases. 
Further, the existing results suggest that the magnitude and speed of price transmission 
varies considerably across sectors, stages of the agri-food supply chain and countries 
(Perekhozhuk et al., 2017). The results also depend on whether we look at processed or 
unprocessed products, whether we look at private label products or ’national brand’ types 
of products or whether we look at sales during the high season or sales during the low 
season, whether we look at products that are supplied more or less over the whole year and 
so on (see, for example, Loy et al., 2015). What follows is that drawing any general 
conclusions about patterns of price behaviour within the agri-food supply chain is very 
difficult. Moreover, it is also not clear at all to what extent we can attribute the observed 
asymmetries in price transmission to the abuse of market power (imbalances in bargaining 
power). This is because unequal distribution of bargaining power does not need to equate 
with the behaviour leading to asymmetric price transmission (McCorriston, 2002; Sexton, 
2013; Bakucs et al., 2014). In addition, there are also alternative explanations which may 
account for incomplete and/or asymmetric pass-through of prices. These explanations draw 
on, for example, the so-called menu costs (i.e. costs occurring with the re-pricing and 
adoption of a new pricing strategy), the so-called search costs (consumers may have 
problems with finding information on prices, thus giving retailers the room to use 
asymmetric price transmission to maximise their profits) or the presence of government 
intervention (Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004). Overall then, while the existing 
findings may be indicative of some problems related to the way price changes are 
transmitted in the agri-food supply chain, they should not be automatically viewed as proof 
of the presence of UTPs or an imbalanced distribution of bargaining power. Further, the 
problems with establishing firm conclusions from these studies seem to additionally suggest 
that the focus in the research and policy should be broader and involve not only 
transactions between given parties, but try to look at the supply chain as a whole. This is 
because transactions within the supply chain are interdependent and therefore focusing on 
single transactions may lead us to overlook important interactions and effects appearing in 
the other stages of the agri-food supply chain. 
As far as the studies into the effect of delayed payments are concerned, here the literature 
seems to be more unanimous. That said, as already mentioned, the existing evidence is 
mostly for a specific context of transition countries. These were countries characterised by 
several disruptions affecting the functioning of local agri-food markets (Rozelle and 
Swinnen, 2004). Therefore, the findings from this literature relate to the environment in 
which farmers’ relationships with sectors downstream from them were much different than 
the one we currently observe in most of the EU Member States. That being said, this 
literature unanimously point to the fact that delayed payments from farmers’ contractors 
do have a negative impact on investments undertaken at the farm and farm output. On the 
other hand, it should be noted that there is also evidence showing that some processors 
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tried to establish long-term relationships with farmers so as to give them more incentives to 
increase investments at the farm and thus increase their productivity and output levels 
(Dries and Swinnen, 2004; Dries et al., 2009; Swinnen, 2007). These actions involved 
processors trying to rebuild their reputation and trustworthiness by paying on time and 
providing their suppliers with various assistance programmes (see, for example, Gow et al., 
2000). As several examples indicate, this had a very profound and quite rapid positive effect 
on both investment decisions and output at the farm level. What should also be noted is 
that there are several studies indicating that the assistance programmes mentioned above 
are not limited to large-scale producers and powerful downstream companies engage in 
transactions also with relatively small farm producers (see for example, Swinnen, 2007 and 
citations therein). Further, there are also some studies finding that powerful downstream 
companies are involved in activities which aim to make farm production practices more 
economically and socially sustainable and to better respond to consumer demand. In this 
light, unequal distribution of bargaining power does not need to lead to small farmers’ 
exclusion from the market, nor to their marginalisation. Obviously, there is a need for 
further research to better understand under which conditions this optimistic scenario may 
take place. 
The literature concerned with the issue of imbalance in the distribution of bargaining power 
within the agri-food supply chain also provides interesting insights with respect to tools that 
may help farmers to improve, at least to some extent, their position and countervail the 
power of processors and/or retailers. Through that, they may also be expected to indirectly 
address some concerns related to UTPs. One potential way to achieve that is through 
establishing producer groups/producer organisations. The rationale behind it is that acting 
together should contribute to strengthening farmers’ relatively weak position in the food 
supply chain by allowing them to exploit economies of scale in producing and marketing 
their output (Menard, 2007). In line with this view, there exists some evidence indicating 
that producer groups may help farmers to reduce costs of contracting with third parties and 
reduce costs of organising transactions between many small farmers and a main contractor 
(Bijman et al., 2012; Hendrikse and Bijman, 2002). 
In this context, several other issues which might be of interest to policy-makers could be 
mentioned. First, qualitative evidence shows that horizontal cooperation between farmers, 
even though it may be viewed as a tool which is likely to strengthen farmers’ bargaining 
power vis-à-vis their contractors, is sometimes initiated by downstream firms. While at first 
this may look counter-intuitive, the rationale behind it could be presented as follows. 
Encouraging farmers to act together allows downstream firms to reduce costs related to 
organising transactions with their suppliers. Importantly, this may also help downstream 
firms to better control the quality of supplies. To see this, one may note that instead of 
getting involved in tedious negotiations with each and every supplier, downstream firms 
negotiate all the quality standards with the cooperative and the outcome of the 
negotiations is then binding to all cooperative members. Thanks to this, downstream firms 
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save on transaction costs and these savings apparently may exceed potential losses related 
to the fact that farmers are paid higher prices, due to their increased bargaining power. In 
relation to that, two further issues could be mentioned. One of them relates to free-riding 
which arises when the price provided to farmers as an outcome of negotiations between 
farmers’ cooperative (association) and a downstream firm applies also to those farmers who 
are not members of the cooperative. The second problem relates to adverse selection and 
stems from the fact that a cooperative often gathers heterogeneous producers as far as the 
quality of their product is concerned. In that case, the likely scenario is that low-quality 
producers will drive high-quality producers out of the market. 
Another potential tool to increase farmers’ bargaining power, and thus to indirectly 
decrease their vulnerability to UTPs, is to make their product unique on the market. Indeed, 
there is some evidence indicating that farmers producing niche products allow their 
contractors (be it retailers or processors) to use these supplies in order to distinguish 
themselves from their competitors. An example of such niche products may include 
Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) products. Another example of how the countervailing 
power of downstream segments of the agri-food supply chain can be achieved relates to 
technological innovations applied at the farm level, which allow farmers to offer high-quality 
products and to deliver them throughout the year. 
 
3.3. UTP’s impact on consumers 
When trying to capture the impact of UTPs on consumer welfare the main challenges largely 
overlap with the ones mentioned in relation to capturing the impact of UTPs on farmers. 
Three of them seem to be the most important. First, UTPs are a collective name for very 
heterogeneous practices which may include, for example, transferring additional risks or 
costs onto a contractor, terminating the relationship without having justified reasons for 
doing so, receiving benefits without providing adequate services in return, or introducing 
retroactive changes to the contract (European Commisison, 2014). What follows is that it is 
difficult to find a study focusing on the impact of UTPs as a whole. Instead, most of the 
studies focus on a specific measure which is often considered to qualify as UTP. Further, 
most of the existing papers investigate the impact of a given business-to-business practice 
regardless of whether it is fair or unfair. 
The second challenge relates to the fact that there is no consensus among researchers 
regarding the impacts of UTPs on consumers. The results obtained up to this date are 
conditional on the assumptions taken, market conditions analysed and available data. 
The data required for analysing the issue in question constitute the third important 
challenge. These are typically private information which firms do not want to share. As a 
result, a majority of papers trying to explain various impacts that UTPs may have on 
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consumers is theoretical. In contrast, there are very few studies that would bring these 
different theories to empirical testing. 
The main empirical approaches adopted by studies investigating the effects of UTPs on 
consumers can be classified as follows. The first takes advantage of various types of micro 
data, such as: the scanner data, home scan, new product databases (Villas-Boas, 2007; 
Bonnet and Dubois, 2015; Richards and Patterson, 2004 or Sudhir and Rao, 2006). These 
data are applied to econometric analysis, which is aimed at estimating some of the 
unobserved private information usually concerning pricing behaviour of a given firm or firms 
from a specific sector. While this method can provide very valuable insights on, for example, 
using two-part tariffs, it neglects other forms of UTPs which may be present and which have 
some consequences for consumers. The other limitation of these kinds of studies is that 
they are heavily dependent on assumptions regarding the industry structure or the cost 
function of firms included in the analysis. 
The second empirical approach to study the impact of UTPs on consumers is based on using 
surveys among firms/managers (Bloom et al., 2000; Rao and Mahi, 2003; Sudhir and Rao, 
2006). This approach covers a number of important issues related to the impacts of UTPs. 
Yet, collecting these kinds of data can be problematic, as managers responding to the 
questionnaire may be reluctant to reveal some of the information relevant from the 
researchers’ point of view. Further, this kind of data often allows for qualitative analysis 
rather than for quantitative analysis. What follows is that the question arises to what extent 
the results from studies using this approach can be generalised to a broader context and to 
what extent they can be used to highlight some details of the mechanisms behind the 
observed phenomena. 
The third approach used in studies interested in identifying the impact of UTPs on 
consumers is to take advantage of highly aggregated data to illustrate general tendencies 
and confront them with the developed theories (Klein and Wright, 2007; Hamilton, 2003; 
Sullivan, 1997). While these studies offer good tools to explore some of the issues and allow 
for creating some stylised facts, they provide a very week tool for inference. 
The fourth approach which seems the most appropriate to study the issue in question is 
based on store-level data and on actual shelf data, in particular (Wright, 2007). These data 
provide an opportunity to use econometric tools which enables estimating the causal 
relationship between the analysed phenomena. Yet, what should be stressed is that getting 
access to this kind of data is very difficult as they include sensitive information. Further, they 
are often limited to a particular store (chain at best) which means that they can show little 
about general trends and overall picture. 
The fifth and final approach used in empirical studies interested in finding out what are the 
impacts of UTPs on consumers is a case study approach (Federal Trade Commission, 2003; 
Bronsteen et al., 2005). It allows for an in-depth analysis, but again the question arises 
whether it can be used for making general inferences. 
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The investigation of the specific effect that UTPs may have on consumers can be based on 
three alternative strategies. One is to focus on changes in consumer welfare in the situation 
when we move from fair to unfair practices. A change in consumer welfare can be 
approximated by the changes in prices that consumers pay for a certain bundle of their 
preferred products or by the changes in the quantities they can afford. Another strategy is 
to look at how using UTPs affects the variety of goods which are available on the market. 
Thirdly, one can investigate how moving from fair to unfair practices affects quality and 
safety of products that consumers can purchase. Alternatively, instead of looking at the 
introduction of UTPs — which might be difficult to observe — one can investigate the 
impacts of changes in intensity with which a given practice is used. 
When trying to establish the impact of UTPs on consumer welfare, one can, for example, 
attempt to find out what share of benefits created by using UTPs by one or the other 
business partner is transmitted towards consumers. An often investigated practice in this 
context is the so-called reverse margin practice, which bundles the purchase of goods by 
buyers with some additional services which buyers offer to suppliers for a charge (e.g. listing 
fees, slotting allowances, negotiation fees, participation to quality programmes, new store 
opening etc.; for other definitional issues see also European Commission, 2014). Three 
aspects seem to be crucial here. The first one concerns the extent to which these reverse 
margin practices allow the transfer of risks incurred by buyers on suppliers (or, to put it in a 
slightly different way, to what extent reverse margin practices allow buyers to use supplier’s 
money to compensate for certain risks that buyers incur). The second issue concerns the 
extent to which reverse margin practices allow the transfer of costs from buyers to 
suppliers. Finally, the third issue concerns the extent to which these practices allow buyers 
to extract a greater share from the surplus created in the relationship with a supplier. The 
Green paper prepared by the European Commission (European Commission, 2013) 
considers these practices to be unfair if the charge for these additional services is 
disproportionate to their value or to the risks incurred or if these practices are not 
transparent. 
UTPs’ impact on consumer surplus 
The literature on the relationship between reverse margin practices and consumer surplus is 
inconclusive. Importantly, this relates to both theoretical studies as well as to empirical 
works. While a number of papers find that reverse margin practices reduce consumer 
welfare (Rennhoff, 2008; Chambolle and Christin, 2017; Shaffer, 1991; 2005; Marx and 
Shaffer, 2004; 2007; 2010; Bloom et al., 2000), others find an ambiguous effect (Foros et al., 
2009; Innes and Hamilton, 2012; Miklós-Thal et al., 2011) and yet another set of studies 
points to a positive impact (Hamilton, 2003; Wright, 2007; Sullivan, 1997; Bronsteen et al., 
2005; Wang et al., 2012). 
The theoretical arguments behind these studies can be summarised as follows. A 
straightforward argument suggesting a negative impact of reverse margin practices on 
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consumer welfare is that suppliers need to cover the costs of the additional services they 
are charged for and this may imply an increase in prices. Some studies also provide 
theoretical models suggesting that reverse margin practices enable collusion among buyers 
and thus contribute to strengthening oligopoly power which in turn has a detrimental effect 
on consumer welfare (Piccolo and Miklós-Thal, 2012; Gilo and Yehezkel, 2015). On the other 
hand, some other theoretical models indicate that if buyers do not use their oligopsony 
power towards suppliers, then reverse margin practices may result in suppliers producing 
larger quantities. The latter result in turn is beneficial for consumers. The key factor to drive 
these different outcomes is the degree of competition between buyers (Hamilton, 2003). 
The higher the oligopoly power of buyers towards consumers, the higher the probability 
that reverse margin practices will decrease consumer welfare. 
As far as the impact of retroactive changes to the contract and unjustified termination of 
the commercial relationship on consumer welfare is concerned, the following points seem 
to be worth noting. Similar to what was said above about the impact of reverse margin 
practice, one of the crucial parameters that decides whether consumers gain from 
retroactive changes/unjustified termination of the contract between buyers and suppliers is 
the degree of oligopoly power of the buyers (Weyl and Fabinger, 2013). Again, the higher 
the oligopoly power of the buyers, the lower the share of benefits gained from suppliers 
through UTPs, which is transmitted to consumers. In this context, it might be worth 
mentioning however that this conclusion is not that obvious, if we consider the situation in 
which only some buyers use UTPs, whereas others do not (Inderst and Valletti, 2011). If 
there is no close substitute for the product under investigation and buyers face competitive 
pressure from each other, we may have the so-called waterbed effect, i.e. the situation in 
which pushing down prices through UTPs may result in higher prices for consumers across 
all buyers. This is because more favourable conditions for more powerful buyers (those 
using UTPs) may lead to worse conditions for their less powerful competitors, as suppliers 
may want to price discriminate among them. In this case, consumer welfare would be 
deteriorated. If, in turn, close substitutes for a product under investigation exist, its 
suppliers have no incentives to price discriminate among the buyers and an increase in 
consumer welfare might be expected.  
UTPs’ impact on product variety 
After briefly reviewing the evidence on the impact of UTPs on consumer welfare, it seems 
worth reviewing the existing studies and analysing the relationship between UTPs and 
product variety and innovation. One aspect which is relatively often researched in this 
context again concerns the impact of reverse margin practice. As before, however, the 
existing literature does not lead to unambiguous conclusions. Some papers indicate that 
reverse margin practices lead to a wider assortment (Innes and Hamilton, 2012; Hristakeva, 
2016; Sullivan, 1997), others show no clear relationship (Rey and Whinston, 2013; Wright, 
2007; Baake and von Schlippenbach, 2014), whereas yet other papers suggest that reverse 
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margin practices result in narrower assortment and less varieties (Marx and Shaffer, 2007; 
2010; Bloom et al., 2000; Rao and Mahi, 2003). 
On theoretical grounds, one can account for the negative relationship (i.e. reverse margin 
practice reducing assortment size) by recalling that shelf space in retailers’ outlets is limited. 
What follows is that, assuming this shelf space is in demand among suppliers, reverse 
margin practices may act as an auction to select those suppliers that are willing to make the 
greatest concessions to retailers (or, to put it differently, to accept the highest charges for 
additional services) and thanks to this, to extract the highest rents possible (Marx and 
Shaffer, 2007; 2010). What may be additionally noted is that this scenario is particularly 
disadvantageous for small-scale producers, as they are the ones who cannot afford high bids 
(Shaffer, 2005). On the other hand, and this is the argument to explain why reverse margin 
practices may increase the assortment size, consumers’ utility increases with the number of 
varieties offered on the market. While reverse margin practices increase retailers’ prices, 
they also increase retailers’ benefits from attracting marginal customers to their store. 
Increasing variety on offer helps to assure that customers are still willing to come to the 
store, notwithstanding the higher prices they have to pay (Innes and Hamilton, 2013). An 
interesting perspective on these issues is highlighted by Baake and von Schlippenbach 
(2014) who emphasise that the key parameters which are decisive for the ultimate effect of 
reverse margin practices on assortment size are retailers’ bargaining power and the degree 
of substitutability between suppliers’ products. High retailers’ bargaining power and close 
substitutability between suppliers’ products lead to a narrower assortment. In contrast, low 
retailers’ bargaining power and lack of substitutability between suppliers’ product leads to a 
larger assortment. 
UTPs’ impact on innovation 
As regards the impact of reverse margin practices on innovation, the story is similar to the 
one explaining the impact of UTPs on assortment. One difference is that here we also need 
to take into account another dimension, namely the one related to risks which always 
accompany the introduction of a new product on the market. However, as before, in this 
case, the existing literature is inconclusive. Some papers suggest a positive relationship (i.e. 
reverse margin practices favouring innovation) (Sullivan, 1997; Klein and Wright, 2007; 
Richards and Patterson, 2004), whereas others suggest no clear relationship (Bloom et al., 
2000) and yet another studies suggest a negative relationship (Chambolle and Christin, 
2017; Shaffer, 1991). 
Theoretical arguments which are used to support these results can be summarised as 
follows. A positive relationship between reverse margin practices and innovation can be 
explained by arguing that reverse margin practices compensate retailers with the risks 
associated with making shelf space available for new products. In addition, reverse margin 
practices act as a sort of screening-signalling mechanism. On the one hand, the charges 
related to these practices will be accepted only by those suppliers who are sure that their 
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innovation will be successful. On the other hand, consumers can also be sure that what they 
see on the shelf is a successful innovation. As far as the negative relationship between 
reverse margin practices and innovation is concerned, it can be supported by the following 
argument. These practices increase the costs of innovation and require a sizeable capital, 
especially for relatively small innovators. Further, these are sunk costs for a specific 
transaction. This in turn increases suppliers’ vulnerability to unfair termination of the 
commercial relationship or retroactive changes to the contract and allows retailers to 
extract a higher share of surplus created by a given transaction. It might be noted however 
that Inderst and Wey (2007) argue for the opposite, i.e. that higher bargaining power of 
retailers and a threat of termination of the contract may encourage innovation as, under 
these circumstances, these are precisely the innovative products which allow suppliers to 
strengthen their financial situation. 
UTPs’ impact on quality and safety 
Yet another issue considered in the literature devoted to impacts of UTPs concerns their 
effect on quality and safety of products purchased by consumers. That said, it should be 
noted that the literature on this issue is still very limited and mostly theoretical. Some of the 
studies adopt a broader view and investigate the impact of bargaining power on food 
quality and safety (Battigalli et al., 2007). Given the interest of this report, particularly 
interesting is the paper by Yehezkel (2014). This study argues that reverse margin practices, 
and slotting allowances in particular, provide suppliers with an incentive to quality testing 
and to provide products of high quality. 
A related strand of the literature deals with food safety and food quality standards and tries 
to understand how these standards affect the governance of agri-food supply chains 
(Fulponi, 2006; Russo et al., 2014). One of the findings coming out of this literature which 
may be relevant to UTPs is that the latter seem to be highly interdependent. This means 
that it is rarely the case that a specific UTP is used in isolation. Instead, it occurs much more 
frequently that the whole package of UTPs is in place. This is of importance for the following 
reasons. Let us consider again reverse margin practices and recognise that they are a type of 
upfront payment made by suppliers to buyers (and therefore sunk costs incurred by one 
party to enter the transaction) and assume that there is also a threat of unfair termination 
of the contract by the buyer. If the contract is terminated, then the supplier cannot recover 
its sunk costs. In this context, the supplier has a strong incentive to comply with the 
conditions made by the buyer. This in turn may result in the so-called separating equilibrium 
in which only those suppliers that are certain to fulfil these conditions, i.e. those that are 
more efficient, will enter the relationship with the buyer. Less efficient suppliers will not 
enter the transaction, being afraid of buyers terminating the contract, without giving the 
suppliers a chance to recover their sunk costs. What follows is that the simultaneous 
presence of reverse margin practices and a threat of unfair termination of the contract give 
the buyer the opportunity to exert a strong control over their supply chain (ensuring that 
suppliers are efficient and meet the standards set by the buyer without being monitored). In 
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theory, if the standards relate to food quality and safety, then interdependence of UTPs may 
be in line with the interest of consumers. In practice however, everything depends on 
whether the buyer finds it profitable to introduce these particular standards. 
Summing up, the literature is far from having a consensus on the impacts of UTPs on 
consumers. The magnitude and the sign of the effect seem to depend on several contingent 
factors. Holding all other things constant, UTPs may be expected to harm consumers if 
buyers have oligopoly power, products are undifferentiated and consumers exhibit low 
demand for variety. In contrast to several models dealing with market power, which often 
present both suppliers and consumers willing to limit the market power of the buyers, the 
literature on UTPs clearly shows that often the interests of suppliers and consumers may 
not be aligned with each other. While in some cases UTPs may be harmful for suppliers 
(farmers), they may be beneficial for consumers. This is important as it suggests that no 
matter what policy towards UTPs will be adopted, it will have to weigh the interests of one 
group against the interests of the other group. 
 
3.4. Conclusions and policy implications 
Even though there exist a number of good arguments for why UTPs may bring about 
negative consequences for various agents operating at different stages of the agri-food 
supply chain, the empirical evidence in this respect is very limited. Moreover, the scant 
evidence we do have is not unambiguous. Further, as the example of various opinions on 
slotting allowances clearly shows, we are still far from reaching a consensus on which 
practices should be considered as ‘unfair’ and which practices should be seen as an 
acceptable tool to increase one’s chances to win the competition. What follows is that 
further research is needed to provide more insights into the issue in question and to see to 
what extent the concerns, which are often formulated both in political and academic circles 
about UTPs and their impacts, can be substantiated. 
A related but distinct point is the following. Notwithstanding the fact that politicians and 
various decision-makers are under strong pressure to fight against UTPs, it should be 
emphasised that there are also many unknowns with respect to the effects of potential 
government responses aiming to address the assumed inefficiencies resulting from UTPs. As 
a result, any policy intervention in this area should be taken with caution. Further, before 
making the decision about optimal policy towards UTPs, it seems important to remember 
that something which is considered ’unfair’ does not need to be inefficient, and vice versa. 
It should also be noted that while fighting against UTPs may improve the situation of agents 
at a particular stage of the agri-food supply chain (for example, by contributing to lower 
prices for consumers) it may, at the same time, make governing transactions within the 
chain more difficult. This suggests that policy-makers concerned with UTPs should look at 
them, taking into account the whole supply chain and not only its specific elements or 
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relationships between particular agents. This discussion also clearly shows that policy goals 
behind any intervention addressing problems related to UTPs need to be well specified (as 
UTPs involve many contrasting interests), internally consistent with each other and 
transparent. 
In this context, two other important questions arise. The first relates to whether we should 
opt for general rules regarding UTPs or to look into each and every individual case 
separately. From the consumers’ perspective, the latter approach seems to be preferable. 
Yet, if we take a broader perspective (including the whole society) then the case-by-case 
approach might not be very effective, as it has to assume that in each case the harmed party 
will be able to sue the harming party. In addition, there is huge uncertainty with respect to 
the outcome of each litigation. The second question in turn relates to whether we should 
opt for EU or Member States regulation (see also Swinnen, 2017 in this volume). As an 
argument in favour of the former alternative, one could recall the ’waterbed effect’ 
argument. If countries differ in terms of their attitude towards UTPs and suppliers can 
discriminate between different markets, then consumers in countries with stricter 
regulations on UTPs will suffer. The probability of the so-called ‘forum shopping’ will also 
add complexity to this picture. 
 
3.5. References 
Assefa, T., Meuwissen, M. and Oude Lansink A. (2014). ‘Price Volatility Transmission in Food 
Supply Chains: A Literature Review’, Agribusiness, 31(1), 3-13. 
Baake, P., and von Schlippenbach, V. (2014). ‘The Impact of Upfront Payments on 
Assortment Decisions in Retailing’. Review of Industrial Organization, 44(1), 95-111. 
Bakucs, Z., Fałkowski, J. and Fertő, I. (2014). ‘Does Market Structure Influence Price 
Transmission in the Agro-food Sector? A Meta-analysis Perspective’. Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 65(1), 1-25. 
Battigalli, P., Fumagalli, C., and Polo, M. (2007). ‘Buyer power and quality improvements’. 
Research in Economics, 61(2), 45-61. 
Bijman, J., Iliopoulos, C., Poppe, K.J., Gijselinckx, C., Hagedorn, K., Hanisch, M., Hendrikse, 
G.W.J., Kühl, R., Ollila, P., Pyykkönen, P., Sangen, G. van der (2012). Support for 
Farmers’ Cooperatives, Wageningen: Wageningen UR. 
Bloom, P.N., Gundlach, G.T., and Cannon, J.P. (2000). ‘Slotting allowances and fees: Schools 
of thought and the views of practicing managers’. Journal of Marketing, 64(2), 92-108. 
Bonnet, C. and Dubois, P. (2015). Identifying Two Part Tariff Contracts with Buyer Power: 
Empirical Estimation on Food Retailing. TSE Working Paper 15-575. 
Bonnet, C., Dubois, P., Klapper, D. and Villas-Boas, S. (2013). ‘Empirical Evidence on the Role 
of Nonlinear Wholesale Pricing and Vertical Restraints on Cost Pass-Through,’ The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(2), 500-515. 
35 
Bronsteen, P., Elzinga, K. G., and Mills, D. E. (2005). ‘Price competition and slotting 
allowances’. The Antitrust Bulletin, 50(2), 267-284. 
Chambolle, C., and Christin, C. (2017). ‘New Product Introduction and Slotting Fees.’ 
Available at https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01458949/document 
Dries, L. (2017). ‘The economic impact of unfair trading practices on upstream suppliers 
(farmers).’ Paper presented at the workshop on ‘Unfair Trading Practices in the Food 
Supply Chain’, European Commission, Brussels 17-18 July 2017. 
Dries, L. and Swinnen, J.F.M. (2004). ‘Foreign Direct Investment, Vertical Integration, and 
Local Suppliers: Evidence from the Polish Dairy Sector’, World Development, 32(9), 
1525-1544. 
Dries, L. and Swinnen, J.F.M. (2010). ‘The Impact of Interfirm Relationships on Investment: 
Evidence from the Polish Dairy Sector’, Food Policy, 35, 121-129. 
Dries, L., Germenji, E., Noev, N. and Swinnen, J.F.M. (2009). ‘Farmers, Vertical Coordination, 
and the Restructuring of Dairy Supply Chains in Central and Eastern Europe’, World 
Development, 37(11), 1742- 1758. 
European Commission (2013). Green paper on unfair trading practices in the business-to-
business food and non-food supply chain in Europe, COM/2013/037. 
European Commission (2014). Study on the legal framework covering business-to-business 
unfair trading practices in the retail supply chain. Report prepared for the European 
Commission, DG Internal Market, DG MARKT/2012/049/E. 
Federal Trade Commission (2003). Slotting Allowances in the Retail Grocery Industry: 
Selected Case Studies in Five Product Categories. Available at: 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/use-slotting-allowances-
retail-grocery-industry/slottingallowancerpt031114.pdf 
Foros, Ø., Kind, H. J., and Sand, J. Y. (2009). ‘Slotting allowances and manufacturers’ retail 
sales effort.’ Southern Economic Journal, 76(1), 266-282. 
Fulponi, L. (2006). ‘Private voluntary standards in the food system: The perspective of major 
food retailers in OECD countries.’ Food policy, 31(1), 1-13. 
Gilo, D., and Yehezkel, Y. (2015). ‘Dynamic downstream collusion with secret vertical 
contracts.’ Available at 
https://iwww.tau.ac.il/~yehezkel/R_Yaron %20Yehezkel %20David %20Gilo %20Dyna
mic %20vertical %20relations_paper3.pdf 
Gorton, M. and White, J. (2007). ‘Transformation and contracting in the supply chains of the 
former soviet union: evidence from Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine’, 
in Swinnen, J.F.M. (Ed.), Global Supply Chains, Standards and the Poor, CABI, Oxon, 
175-187. 
Gow, H.R. and Swinnen, J.F.M. (1998). ‘Up- and downstream restructuring, foreign direct 
investment, and hold-up problems in agricultural transition’, European Review of 
Agricultural Economics, 25(3), 331- 350. 
36 
Gow, H.R., Streeter, D.H. and Swinnen, J.F.M. (2000). ‘How private contract enforcement 
mechanisms can succeed where public institutions fail: the case of Juhocukor a.s.’, 
Agricultural Economics, 23(3), 253-265. 
Hamilton, S.F. (2003). ‘Slotting allowances as a facilitating practice by food processors in 
wholesale grocery markets: profitability and welfare effects’. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 85(4), 797-813. 
Hendrikse, G.W.J. and Bijman, J. (2002). ‘On the emergence of new growers’ associations: 
self-selection versus countervailing power’. European Review of Agricultural 
Economics, 29(2), 255–269. 
Hristakeva, S. (2016). ‘How Do Vertical Contracts Affect Product Availability? An Empirical 
Study of the Grocery Industry’. Available at 
http://hristakeva.com/files/Hristakeva_JMP.pdf 
Inderst, R. and Valletti, T.M. (2011). ‘Buyer power and the ’waterbed effect’.’ Journal of 
Industrial Economics, 59(1), 1-20. 
Inderst, R. and Wey, C. (2007). ‘Buyer power and supplier incentives.’ European Economic 
Review, 51(3), 647-667. 
Innes, R. and Hamilton, S.F. (2012). ‘Slotting Allowances and Product Variety in Oligopoly 
Markets.’ Available at http://www.tse-
fr.eu/sites/default/files/medias/doc/conf/iofood/IOFOOD2012/stephen_hamilton.pdf 
Innes, R. and Hamilton, S. F. (2013). ‘Slotting allowances under supermarket oligopoly’. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 95(5), 1216-1222. 
Klein, B. and Wright, J. D. (2007). ‘The economics of slotting contracts.’ The Journal of Law 
and Economics, 50(3), 421-454. 
Loy J.P., Holm, T., Steinhagen, C. and Glauben, T. (2015). ‘Cost pass-through in differentiated 
product markets: a disaggregated study for milk and butter’, European Review of 
Agricultural Economics, 42(3), 441-471. 
Lloyd, T.A., McCorriston, S., Morgan, C.W. and Rayner, A.J. (2006). ‘Food scares, market 
power and price transmission: the UK BSE crisis’, European Review of Agricultural 
Economics, 33(2), 119-147. 
Marx, L.M. and Shaffer, G. (2004). ‘Slotting allowances and scarce shelf space.’ Marketing 
Science, 22(2), 198-230. 
Marx, L.M. and Shaffer, G. (2007). ‘Upfront payments and exclusion in downstream 
markets.’ The RAND Journal of Economics, 38(3), 823-843. 
Marx, L.M. and Shaffer, G. (2010). ‘Slotting allowances and scarce shelf space.’ Journal of 
Economics and Management Strategy, 19(3), 575-603. 
McCorriston, S. (2002). ‘Why should imperfect competition matter to agricultural 
economists?’, European Review of Agricultural Economics, 29, 349–371. 
McCorriston, S. (2013). Competition in the Food Chain. Background Paper for the OECD 
Competition Roundtable in Paris (October, 2013). 
Menard, C. (2007). Cooperatives: Hierarchies or Hybrids? In: K. Karantininis and J. Nilsson 
(eds.) Vertical Markets and Cooperative Hierarchies. Springer, 1–17. 
37 
Meyer, J. and von Cramon-Taubadel, S. (2004). ‘Asymmetric Price Transmission: A survey’, 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 55(3): 581-611. 
Miklós-Thal, J., Rey, P., and Vergé, T. (2011). ‘Buyer power and intrabrand coordination.’ 
Journal of the European Economic Association, 9(4), 721-741. 
OECD (2015). Food Price Formation. 7th Food Chain Analysis Network Meeting. available at: 
https://www.oecd.org/site/agrfcn/meetings/agrfcn-7-food-price-formation-paper-
october-2015.pdf 
OECD/FAO (2015). OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2015, OECD Publishing, Paris, DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/agr_outlook-2015-en. 
Perekhozhuk, O., Glauben, T., Teuber, R. and Grings, M. (2017). ‘Approaches and methods 
for Econometric Analysis of Market Power: Survey and Empirical Comparison’, Journal 
of Economic Surveys, 31(1), 303-325. 
Piccolo, S., and Miklós‐Thal, J. (2012). ‘Colluding through suppliers’. The RAND Journal of 
Economics, 43(3), 492-513. 
Rao, A. R. and Mahi, H. (2003). ‘The price of launching a new product: Empirical evidence on 
factors affecting the relative magnitude of slotting allowances’. Marketing Science, 
22(2), 246-268. 
Reardon, T. and Timmer, C.P. (2007). ‘Transformation of markets for agricultural output in 
developing countries since 1950: how have things changed?’, in Evenson, R., Pingali, P. 
and Shulz, T.P. (Eds), Handbook of Agricultural Economics: Agricultural Development, 
Vol. 3, Elsevier, 2807-2855. 
Rennhoff, A. (2008). ‘Paying for shelf space: An investigation of merchandising allowances in 
the grocery industry’. Journal of Agricultural and Food Industrial Organization, 6(1), 
1233. 
Rey, P. and Whinston, M. D. (2013). ‘Does retailer power lead to exclusion?’. The RAND 
Journal of Economics, 44(1), 75-81. 
Richards, T. J. and Patterson, P. M. (2004). ‘Slotting allowances as real options: an 
alternative explanation’. The Journal of Business, 77(4), 675-696. 
Rozelle, S. and Swinnen, J.F.M. (2004). ‘Success and failure of reform: insights from the 
transition of agriculture’, Journal of Economic Literature, 42(2), 404-456. 
Russo, C., Sorrentino, A. and Menapace, L. (2017). ‘The impact of UTPs on consumers: 
review of empirical studies.’ Paper presented at the workshop on ‘Unfair Trading 
Practices in the Food Supply Chain’, European Commission, Brussels 17-18 July 2017. 
Russo, C., Perito, M. A., and Di Fonzo, A. (2014). ‘Using private food safety standards to 
manage complexity: a moral hazard perspective’. Agricultural Economics Review, 
15(2), 113-125. 
Sexton, R.J. (2013). ‘Market power, misconceptions, and modern agricultural markets’. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 95(2), 209–219. 
Sexton, R.J. and Lavoie, N. (2001). Food processing and distribution: An industrial 
organization approach, In: Gardner, B., Rausser, G. (Eds.), Handbook of Agricultural 
Economics, Elsevier Science B.V., Amsterdam, Holland, 863–923. 
38 
Shaffer, G. (1991). ‘Slotting allowances and resale price maintenance: a comparison of 
facilitating practices’. The RAND Journal of Economics, 22(1), 120-135. 
Shaffer, G. (2005). ‘Slotting allowances and optimal product variety’. The BE Journal of 
Economic Analysis and Policy, 5(1), Article 3. 
Sheldon, I. and Sperling, R. (2003). ‘Estimating the extent of imperfect competition in the 
food industry: what have we learned?’, Journal of Agricultural Economics, 54, 89–110. 
Sudhir, K., and Rao, V.R. (2006). ‘Do slotting allowances enhance efficiency or hinder 
competition?’. Journal of Marketing Research, 43(2), 137-155. 
Sullivan, M.W. (1997). ‘Slotting allowances and the market for new products’. The Journal of 
Law and Economics, 40(2), 461-494. 
Swinnen, J.F.M. (Ed.) (2007). Global Supply Chains, Standards and the Poor, CABI, Oxon. 
Vavra, P. and Goodwin, B.K. (2005). ‘Analysis of Price Transmission Along the Food Chain’, 
OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Working Papers, No 3, OECD. 
Villas-Boas, S. (2007). ‘Vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers: Inference 
with limited data’. The Review of Economic Studies, 74(2), 625-652. 
Wang, Y. Y., Lau, H. S., and Wang, J. C. (2012). ‘Defending and improving the ‘slotting fee’: 
how it can benefit all the stakeholders dealing with a newsvendor product with price 
and effort-dependent demand’. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 63(12), 
1731-1751. 
Weyl, G. and Fabinger, M. (2013). ‘Pass-Through as an Economic Tool: Principle of Incidence 
under Imperfect Competition’, Journal of Political Economy, 121(3), 528-583. 
Wright, J. D. (2007). ‘Slotting contracts and consumer welfare’. Antitrust Law Journal, 74(2), 
439-472. 
Yehezkel, Y. (2014). ‘Slotting contracts and consumer welfare’. Journal of Industrial 
Economics, 62, 309-345. 
  
39 
4. Regulating UTPs: diversity versus harmonisation of 
Member State rules 
 
 
Johan Swinnen and Senne Vandevelde 
 
LICOS, KU Leuven 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
UTPs are defined by the European Commission (2013) as ‘practices that grossly deviate from 
good commercial conduct and are contrary to good faith and fair dealing and which are 
typically imposed in a situation of imbalance by a stronger party on a weaker one and can 
exist from any side of the B2B relationship and at any stage in the supply chain’. UTPs 
include, among other things, unilateral changes to existing contracts, unauthorised late 
payments and the refusal to negotiate a contract. Many of these practices are illegal under 
existing rules of contract and civil law. Yet the discussion on UTPs has intensified 
considerably among food chain actors and policy-makers alike in recent years, leading to a 
surge in specific UTP legislation. A big argument in favour of specific rules on UTPs is the so-
called ‘fear factor’, which prevents victims of UTPs to take action through fear of losing their 
business altogether. One can imagine that this factor is even more acute in situations of 
extreme imbalance in market power between buyers and suppliers, as is often the case in 
the food supply chain. 
This note provides an overview of the regulatory environment within which UTPs currently 
operate. Most notably, apart from a voluntary framework, there is no specific European 
legislation on the issue. As such, the regulation of UTPs is almost completely left to the 
Member States. Most of them have some sort of legislation in place, but the modalities and 
the stringency of those rules varies widely across countries. Therefore, this note contains 
the following sections. First, we discuss some conceptual issues related to EU harmonisation 
in general, arriving at a cost-benefit framework. Second, we introduce a classification and a 
ranking of the different Member States in terms of the stringency of their treatment of 
UTPs. In the third section, we briefly consider the effectiveness of the UTP regulation by 
looking at some countries’ regulations in more depth. In the fourth section, we look at the 
UTP rules at the European level while the fifth section uses all of these different elements to 
apply the conceptual framework to the specific issue of UTPs. Finally, this note concludes by 
offering a tentative recommendation which aims to take into account most of the 
arguments presented. 
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4.2. Conceptual framework of EU harmonisation 
In light of the already extensive efforts to investigate the usefulness of EU-wide UTP 
regulation and in the anticipation of a more rigorous impact assessment, this note aims to 
take a step back and provide a more general economic conceptual framework, as well as 
some of the more detailed arguments for or against harmonisation of UTP rules. 
From the outset, it is clear that harmonisation at the EU level of any type of regulation (not 
just UTP regulation) will have costs and benefits. The analysis of the costs and benefits of 
the optimal level of regulation has a long tradition in the economic literature, going back to 
Tiebout (1956), who argued that local authorities are best placed to enact and implement 
regulation when citizens are mobile between the different localities. The reasoning behind 
this is that people will choose those states or communities that offer the services that best 
correspond to their preferences. His argument offers a logical explanation for the variety of 
legal systems (as shown in the previous sections) that exist today. Of course, Tiebout’s 
model only works when certain, rather restrictive, conditions are met. Citizens have to be 
equally informed about regulation everywhere, people have to be completely mobile and 
regulation in one place cannot have repercussions for people living somewhere else. 
Whatever its limitations, Tiebout’s work allows and forces us to think about decentralisation 
of regulation as the default state of the world. The question regulators should then ask 
themselves is not what should be decentralised, but rather what should be centralised (or 
harmonised). This is what is sometimes referred to as ‘bottom-up federalism’ and has also 
to some extent been embraced by the European lawmakers through the subsidiarity 
principle which has been in effect since the Maastricht Treaty (1992). The principle says that 
higher levels of government should not perform tasks that can be performed better by a 
lower level of government. For every different issue, it is thus up to the regulator to trade 
off the benefits and costs of the harmonisation of regulation. Below, we provide an 
overview of four benefits and three costs that should always be considered when analysing 
harmonisation. 
The first benefit of harmonisation is that it allows for the regulation of transboundary 
phenomena. Within the European Union, given the size and proximity of the different 
Member States, this is of course an important argument. Indeed, one would be hard-
pressed to find regulatory issues that do not have any cross-border implications. However, 
several scholars have warned against using the transboundary nature as such as an 
argument for harmonisation (see for example, Faure, 2001). After all, domestic laws can be 
applied externally or can be enforced through cross-border monitoring. 
The second benefit of harmonisation is that it is a step in the direction of a more complete 
common market, whereby competition takes place under the same conditions. Whereas 
this is more a political argument, it is intimately related to the economic argument of 
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preventing a ‘race-to-the-bottom’ in regulation between countries. This argument says that 
competition between jurisdictions will incentivise the creation of rules that are welfare-
decreasing, in which case firms could decide to relocate to those countries with the most 
lenient rules. Likewise, companies supplying firms in countries with lax rules would be at a 
disadvantage (because they would be more open to abusive practices) versus companies 
supplying firms in countries with more stringent rules, even if those suppliers are located in 
the same country. This could be considered as unfair competition. 
A third benefit of harmonisation is related to economies of scale in administration (Faure, 
2001). The argument here is that one (EU) administration to implement and enforce a 
certain issue will always be cheaper than 28 different Member State administrations. 
However, as the case with competition law has shown, having something regulated at 
European level does not necessarily mean that there will be no national authorities anymore 
(each country still has its national competition authority). 
A final, somewhat related, benefit of harmonisation is transaction cost savings. Under 
uniform Community rules, firms and citizens must not spend on information costs. They do 
not have to inform themselves about differences in the substantive law of the EU Member 
States and the way in which these rules are enforced (Van den Bergh, 1998). These 
transaction cost savings may be very important for firms that are active in interstate 
commerce. Uniform rules also help to maintain economies of scale in production and 
distribution arrangements. If diversity in rules prohibits firms from using the same 
production and marketing techniques in larger areas, scale economies may be lost. This 
could potentially have ramifications for consumers as well: if suppliers are unable or afraid 
to be operating in different markets due to this legal uncertainty or variety, they might 
never achieve the necessary scale to be able to engage in meaningful research and 
development operations, thus depriving consumers of innovations and potentially lower 
prices for certain goods (Renda et al., 2014). 
Of course, as with most policy decisions, harmonisation also has costs. The first cost of 
harmonisation concerns the cost of deviating from every community’s or every country’s 
social optimum. In every country, all the actors in the economy (firms, government, 
consumers …) have preferences with regard to most types of regulation. As such, in every 
economy, there exists a socially optimal level of regulation which accurately trades off the 
costs and benefits within that economy. This need not coincide with the political optimum 
which in turn depends on the bargaining and lobbying power of the different actors. In any 
case, whenever there is harmonisation of regulation between different economies, the 
outcome will be a weighted average of the different countries’ social (or political) optimum. 
As such, this harmonisation cost for any single economy can be accurately represented as 
the difference between the level of harmonised regulation and the social optimum of that 
country. This means that sometimes ‘divergent legal rules are better able to satisfy 
heterogeneous preferences of a large population and may thus contribute to increased 
welfare in the European internal market’ (Van den Bergh, 1998). It is worth noting that 
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without any changes to the actors’ preferences, this harmonisation cost will have to be 
incurred every year, rather than once. 
There is also the issue of switching costs, which in this context refers to the costs incurred 
by administrations when they switch from one set of rules to another. As shown by 
Carbonara and Parisi (2007), switching costs are always an impediment to legal 
harmonisation. They can be considered here as a one-period instantiation for authorities of 
the harmonisation costs already described in the previous paragraph. 
Finally, as with any policy decision, harmonisation can lead to over-regulation. This is 
intimately related to the politics of harmonisation. In addition to the deviation to a country’s 
social optimum, the political environment in the EU might be such that the policy that is 
eventually obtained deviates even more from the socially optimum point. Over the course 
of the process of European integration, there is ample evidence that European policy-
makers have opted to adopt the most stringent legislation among the different Member 
States. For instance, in the so-called ‘Chocolate war’, European legislators eventually landed 
close to the (rather stringent) French policy (Meloni and Swinnen, 2016). The same is true 
for the European wine policy, with European wines not being allowed to be produced from 
imported grapes (Meloni and Swinnen, 2014). 
 
4.3. A classification and ranking of UTP regulatory frameworks in 
Member States 
In 2016, the European Commission published a report (COM(2016) 32 final) on unfair 
business-to-business trading practices in the food supply chain. In addition to detailing the 
issue of UTPs itself and offering a description of the early experiences with the Supply Chain 
Initiative, the report mainly focuses on the different ways in which EU Member States have 
undertaken action to combat UTPs. In particular, the report makes a broad distinction 
between three different categories of Member States: those without any UTP legislation, 
those with only a voluntary platform and those with dedicated UTP legislation in place. 
Member States without Regulation 
Not many countries remain without any form of dedicated UTP legislation or voluntary 
framework in the EU. Five Member States are classified in that category: Denmark, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Poland and Sweden. This list has been growing increasingly thin over 
the past couple of years as more and more countries have decided to introduce some form 
of legislation. In the countries where no specific regulation exists, the law prevents many of 
the practices that have been classified as UTPs and as such, victims of UTPs always have the 
option to take their counterparties to court under general legal rules. 
Member States with voluntary platforms 
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There are four countries with only a voluntary platform: Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland, 
Estonia, with Belgium being the country having the longest exposure among them (since 
2010). In fact, the Belgian initiative has served at least in part as inspiration for the EU-wide 
Supply Chain Initiative (SCI), which in turn is what most platforms in other countries were 
modelled after. The initiatives have all been established with the aim of bringing together 
the different actors in the food value chain and resolving issues with UTPs internally. 
Furthermore, all participants are expected to sign a declaration detailing a list of UTPs that 
should be avoided and the rules of procedure of the platform. Voluntary platforms have 
obvious limitations with regard to enforcement. They have been operating with mixed 
success: while the Belgian platform has been in operation for quite some time now and is 
widely reported to have had positive impacts, the Finnish platform was abandoned by the 
national farmers’ union after only one and a half years’ existence. 
Member States with UTP regulation 
The final category comprises 20 Member States who have, in some way or another, 
introduced or amended legislation with the specific aim of targeting UTPs in the food sector. 
15 out of those 20 countries have introduced regulation in the past 6 years while others 
have changed their already existing regulations. Others are considering introducing new 
rules in the months and years to come. It is thus clear that a true regulatory push has been 
materialising in recent times. 
Differences in type of legislation and coverage 
If we were to look only at the typology introduced by the Commission, it would seem as if 
the legislation on UTPs is converging across Member States. While this may be true to an 
extent, the typology masks considerable further heterogeneity in the treatment of UTPs. In 
this section we will first provide a slightly more detailed classification of the different 
regulatory frameworks in the EU and we will continue to refine it until we arrive at a 
tentative ranking of EU countries in terms of the stringency with which UTPs are treated. For 
that reason, we provide a more detailed classification along two dimensions, which more 
accurately captures the underlying differences. 
First, we classify countries’ regimes according to the coverage of UTPs in their legislation or 
initiatives. More specifically, we look at a research study conducted by CEPS (Renda et al., 
2014) and categorise a country as one with low coverage if the number of UTPs covered 
does not exceed six (out of a list of 11 UTPs, which can be found in the Annex). A country is 
considered to have high coverage if more than six UTPs are explicitly or implicitly mentioned 
in their legislation or initiatives. 
The second dimension along which Member States are classified, pertains to the type of 
legislation used. A distinction is made between four categories: countries without any 
(explicit) regulation with regards to UTPs (as in the previous section), countries with only a 
voluntary, self-regulatory initiative (again, as in the previous section), countries which have 
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decided to adapt or extend existing regulation to account for UTPs (which usually involves 
modifications to the country’s competition laws) and finally countries which have 
introduced specific legislation and agencies to tackle UTPs. We try to be exhaustive in 
composing this classification: if a country has both specific legislation and a voluntary 
initiative, it is categorised as having specific legislation since we consider this to be the more 
stringent of the two. 
 
Table 1. Evidence of regulatory fragmentation in UTP regulation 
 
Table 1 summarises the results of this first classification exercise. There is considerable 
regulatory fragmentation across the EU Member States. While the problem of UTPs is 
universal (as demonstrated by several surveys among food market participants), Member 
States have decided to legislate the issue in divergent ways. Some have even come to the 
conclusion that existing laws and regulations are already sufficient to tackle the issue. There 
is a positive correlation between more specific legislation and the number of UTPs covered. 
While this classification already offers a good idea of the UTP regulatory landscape in the 
EU, further distinctions can and should be made. For instance, within the category of 
countries that have introduced specific legislation, different enforcement models of those 
rules are being used. For instance, countries like France and the UK have created dedicated 
agencies to go after those that break the UTP rules. In the next section, we offer examples 
of such cases. In all countries with dedicated enforcement mechanisms, the agencies have 
so-called ex-officio powers, which means they are authorised to open, conduct and conclude 
their own investigation into UTP infractions. Furthermore, most (but not all) enforcement 
agencies allow victims of UTPs to lodge confidential complaints, which is aimed at 
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addressing the ‘fear factor’. In the other countries with specific legislation, enforcement is 
usually conducted by the competition authorities or by the civil court system, which are 
considered here as less stringent than dedicated enforcement. We also consider whether or 
not a Member State has a voluntary platform or code on UTPs (in addition to legislation). 
When taking these further distinctions into account, we can construct a ranking of countries 
in terms of the stringency with which they deal with UTPs. This ranking is shown in Table 2, 
with all the criteria that have been considered for constructing it. 
 
Rank Country 
Legal 
treatment 
Enforcement 
Coverage 
(%) 
Private 
code Authority 
Ex 
officio 
Confidentiality 
1 Croatia Specific Dedicated Yes Yes 91 Yes 
2 France Specific Dedicated Yes Yes 73 Yes 
3 United Kingdom Specific Dedicated Yes Yes 73 Yes 
4 Hungary Specific Dedicated Yes Yes 55 No 
5 Spain Specific Dedicated Yes Yes 27 Yes 
6 Romania Specific Dedicated Yes No 64 No 
7 Slovakia Specific Dedicated Yes No 55 No 
8 Portugal Specific Dedicated Yes No 18 Yes 
9 Slovenia Specific Competition Yes Yes 91 Yes 
10 Czech Republic Specific Competition Yes Yes 64 Yes 
11 Lithuania Specific Competition Yes Yes 55 Yes 
12 Latvia Specific Competition Yes Yes 45 Yes 
13 Italy Specific Competition Yes No 100 No 
14 Bulgaria Specific Competition Yes No 18 Yes 
15 Ireland Specific Competition No No 55 No 
16 Germany Stretched Competition Yes Yes 45 Yes 
17 Cyprus Stretched Competition No Yes 45 No 
18 Austria Stretched Competition No No 55 No 
19 Finland Stretched Competition No No 18 Yes 
20 Greece Stretched Court No No 55 No 
21 Belgium Voluntary Court No No 36 Yes 
22 Estonia Voluntary Court No No 36 Yes 
23 Netherlands Voluntary Court No No 36 Yes 
24 Sweden None Court No No 0 Yes/No 
25 Poland None Court No No 0 Yes/No 
26 Malta None Court No No 0 No 
27 Luxembourg None Court No No 0 No 
28 Denmark None Court No No 0 No 
Table 2. Ranking of EU Member States in terms of the stringency of their UTP regulatory 
framework 
 
4.4. Effectiveness of Member State regulations 
The ranking shown in Table 2 is a measure of the stringency of a Member State’s UTP 
regulatory framework. It should not be considered as a measure for the effectiveness with 
which the problem of UTPs is being addressed within a certain Member State. A country low 
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in the ranking could be more effective in preventing and combating UTPs than even the 
highest country on the list. Indeed, as we will show here, Belgium for instance, ranked only 
21st on our ranking, yet has been rather successful in dealing with UTPs by keeping all the 
actors in the chain involved in its voluntary framework. Additionally, in Figure 1 it is shown 
that there is no clear correlation between the stringency of a country’s regulation and its 
effectiveness. 
 
Figure 1. Perceived occurrence (in %) of UTPs by Member State, ranked from most stringent 
to least stringent UTP regulatory framework (Source: Gentile et al., 2016 and own 
calculations) 
 
To have a closer look at the effectiveness of UTP regulations, it is worth focusing our 
attention on a couple of notable case studies. After all, as the previous sections have shown, 
there is considerable regulatory diversity in the treatment of UTPs between the different EU 
Member States. We will look more closely at five countries, each coming from a different 
side of the regulatory spectrum: France; the UK; Germany; Belgium and Denmark. We will 
briefly consider each country’s history in dealing with UTPs and discuss the different reasons 
why administrations have decided to legislate this issue in such diverse ways. At the end of 
this section, we will distil the main takeaways from these case studies. 
France 
In Table 2, France is among the highest ranked countries in terms of the stringency of their 
approach in dealing with UTPs. Other countries, such as Croatia, the UK, Hungary and Spain 
are comparable in terms of the instruments and methods used but, in our opinion, France 
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has one of the most comprehensive and dense set of measures and agencies all working to 
address the issue of UTPs. 
The most important piece of legislation governing the problem of UTPs is the ‘Droit des 
pratiques restrictives’ which is a part of the commercial code (Renda et al., 2014). It is 
specifically aimed at dealing with unfair practices in vertical relations. In addition, UTPs 
sometimes are the subject of investigations in the context of competition law (specifically 
those articles referring to the abuse of economic dependence) and there are specific 
regulations (and references) included in the 2010 law on the modernisation of the 
agricultural and fishing sectors. Finally, France is not only relying on public legislation to 
combat UTPs, it has also recently started using private and/or voluntary initiatives to 
complement the public portfolio of rules. The French authorities have even developed a 
label, called ‘Relations fournisseur responsables’, which is awarded to companies who 
engage in sustainable and responsible relationships with their suppliers. A ‘Médiateur inter-
entreprises’ deals with mediation in case of conflict regarding commercial relations across 
sectors. 
The French system is not only far-reaching in terms of legislation, but also in terms of 
enforcement. Most importantly, the ‘Direction générale de la Concurrence, de la 
Consummation et de la Répression des Fraudes’ (DGCCRF), which reports to the Ministry of 
Economy, can initiate its own investigations, receive confidential complaints from suppliers 
and, if needed, refer cases to the criminal courts, which in turn have the authority to impose 
criminal sanctions like fines and imprisonment. Additionally, the Ministry has the power to 
engage in structural injunctions, forcing a company to sell off assets to competitors in case 
of wrongdoing. 
United Kingdom 
The genesis of the UK’s experience with UTPs in the food sector can be traced back to 2001 
when the Competition Commission first decided to investigate the groceries retailing sector. 
Following this investigation, a code of practice was introduced to govern the relations 
between the major supermarkets in the UK and their suppliers, called the ‘Supermarket 
Code of Practice’. The success of this voluntary initiative was limited since the number of 
complaints by suppliers kept on rising. Eventually, the Competition Commission decided to 
launch a second investigation in 2008. 
While that second report concluded there was no evidence of abuse by retailers vis-à-vis 
consumers, it expressed concern about some practices that had an impact on upstream 
suppliers. For that reason, it called for the creation of a Groceries Supply Code of Practice 
(GSCOP) and of an Ombudsman to enforce such a code. The Code was eventually created in 
2009 and the role of Ombudsman was to be performed by a so-called Groceries Code 
Adjudicator (GCA), which started its operations in 2013. The GCA only oversees the 
relationships between the 10 biggest retailers in the UK (each with an annual turnover of 
more than GBP 1 billion) and their direct suppliers. It has the power to launch its own 
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investigations into violations of the code by retailers, but also to mediate between retailer 
and supplier at the supplier’s request. Recently, the GCA has also obtained the power to 
impose significant financial penalties on retailers who are in violation of the GSCOP (up to 
1 % of annual turnover). 
Germany 
In contrast with France, Germany has not decided to create new and specific rules with 
respect to UTPs, but rather to stretch their already existing competition law, unfair 
competition law and contract law. In particular, three pieces of legislation play an important 
role in legislating UTPs: the Act Against Unfair Competition, the Act Against Restraints of 
Competition and the German Civil Code (Renda et al., 2014). They often overlap and 
perform complementary roles in the combat against UTPs. To show how the German 
authorities have stretched their existing legislation to address UTPs, it is worth considering 
the Act Against Unfair Competition, which at first was only applicable to the relations 
between companies and their end consumers, but was then extended to also include the 
relationships between companies and their suppliers. 
In terms of enforcement, only those practices addressed by competition law can be subject 
to confidential complaints and ex officio investigations as only the national competition 
authority has the ability to do so. 
In addition, a voluntary platform was also established in 2013 by four organisations which 
together represent the entire food supply chain. The platform is aimed at implementing and 
enforcing the principles of the European Supply Chain Initiative and also offers a dispute-
resolution tool to its subscribers. The dispute resolution mechanism relies on mediation, 
arbitration and even in some cases, expert opinions. 
Belgium 
Belgium is the country with the longest experience in having a voluntary scheme to combat 
UTPs. The scheme was established in the context of the so-called ‘Agro Food Chain 
Consultation’, which brings together representatives of all the different stages in the 
agricultural value chain, from farmers and input suppliers over processors, to retailers. The 
Agro Food Chain Consultation started its operations in 2009 and the code of conduct for fair 
relationships between suppliers and purchasers was signed in the subsequent year (Agro 
Food Chain Consultation, 2010). It has been in operation since that time and in contrast with 
comparable schemes in other countries (for instance, Finland), it is generally considered to 
be a success, proven by the continued involvement of the farmers’ unions and the fact that 
the Belgian model was used as a blueprint for the EU-wide Supply Chain Initiative. 
The code applies to all links within the food chain and while many of the principles of good 
practices are about UTPs, the code also contains stipulations on the sustainable 
development of the chain (defined as finding a good balance between ‘society’, 
‘environment’ and ‘economy’), the careful handling of food products and the sourcing of 
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local produce where possible. As such, the philosophy behind the code of conduct is much 
broader than comparable instruments in other countries. In choosing such a broad scope of 
the Agro Food Chain Consultation, its architects intended to avoid turning the voluntary 
scheme into a zero-sum game between suppliers and retailers, which is often the case when 
the discussion is only about UTPs. The code also offers multiple possibilities for dispute 
settlement between the different parties. Both individual and aggregated complaints are 
welcomed and dealt with by the committee that oversees the activities related to the code 
of conduct. The aggregated dispute settlement mechanism can also be initiated by any of 
the committee members, which means that farmers can for instance complain with their 
union, who in turn raises the issues within the context of the Agro Food Chain Consultation. 
This removes at least some of the hurdles associated with the ‘fear factor’. 
Denmark 
With all the countries discussed so far having undertaken steps to go against UTPs, it is 
useful to consider a case of a country where no regulation or voluntary framework has been 
introduced. This is the case for Denmark, even though its retail sector is among the most 
concentrated in the EU. The argument of the Danish authorities is specified in their response 
to the European Commission’s (2013) Green Paper on UTPs (Danish Ministry of Industry 
Business and Financial Affairs, 2014). They claim that most of the issues presented in the 
Green Paper are already adequately addressed by their competition and marketing laws. In 
particular, they refer to the Danish Marketing Practices Act (which is a part of unfair 
competition law and was an implementation of the EU Directive on Unfair Commercial 
Practices), the Danish Competition Act (national competition law) and the Danish Contract 
Act (Renda et al., 2014). For those issues that are not covered, they fear that additional 
legislation might endanger the carefully struck balance between contractual freedoms and 
the protection of the weaker parties in an agreement. Moreover, the Danish authorities also 
believe that the agreed trade terms are followed in most trade relationships. In other 
words, they are of the opinion that UTPs in contractual relations are the exception rather 
than the rule. 
Further, when it comes to addressing the ‘fear factor’, the Danish government suggests that 
making confidential complaints and ex officio investigations possible might encroach on the 
stronger party’s (in most cases the retailer’s) right to a fair trial. 
Takeaways from case studies 
From these different case studies, a number of takeaways can be distilled which could be 
useful for any form of legislation that might be introduced at the EU level in the future. The 
same of course applies to those countries that have not yet introduced any UTP-specific 
legislation or those thinking about making adjustments to their current framework. 
First of all, as shown in the Belgian case, it is a good idea to widen the scope of the 
discussions on UTPs. The signatories of the Belgian initiative deliberately engaged in talks 
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about trying to enlarge the value of the agricultural sector as a whole, while considering the 
issue of UTPs as an important part of the discussion. They realised that it is easier to talk 
about dividing a pie when the size of that pie is growing. It has ensured that the farmers’ 
organisations have stayed on board and thus partly explains the success of the Belgian 
initiative. At the European level, the legislators might translate this Belgian experience by 
including the discussion on UTPs in the general discussions on the CAP or by enlarging the 
scope of the SCI, rather than continuing to consider it as a separate issue. 
Second, the ‘fear factor’ is absolutely key when it comes to introducing effective legislation 
to deal with UTPs. This is clear in the context of each case study we have considered, but 
especially for the UK. One of the main reasons the original voluntary framework was 
unsuccessful was the lack of a mechanism which allowed for confidential complaints and ex 
officio investigations. Only when that possibility was introduced with the GCA, the 
perception of the framework changed considerably. One could even argue the ‘fear factor’ 
is the main reason why countries decide to explicitly legislate UTPs in the first place. After 
all, many of the transgressions that are considered to be UTPs, such as changing contract 
terms, are already illegal under existing law and can thus be tried in front of the court. 
However, this does not mean it is strictly necessary to introduce public legislation to address 
the fear factor. The example of Belgium for instance has shown that voluntary initiatives 
(when they succeed in keeping the suppliers’ representatives on board) can also provide 
ways to make suppliers less afraid to raise issues related to UTPs with their buyers. In any 
case, whatever legislation the European Commission decides to introduce it will have to 
take the ‘fear factor’ into account more than the current SCI is doing (Gentile et al., 2016). 
Lastly, with the important caveat the ‘fear factor’ being adequately addressed, existing 
legislation already possesses many tools to deal with the problem of UTPs. This is especially 
clear when considering the example of Germany where no new laws were created to deal 
with this issue. Moreover, as mentioned before, many UTPs are by definition illegal 
(consider, for instance the case of Denmark), so they must be included somewhere in the 
existing legislative frameworks of almost every EU Member State. What this takeaway 
means for the European context is that legislators should first consider whether there are 
no laws or initiatives that already exist which could be stretched to also be applicable to 
UTPs. For instance, one immediately thinks about the harmonised consumer protection in 
the unfair commercial practices directive (Directive 2005/29/EC) which could quite readily 
be extended to the protection of suppliers against UTPs. 
 
4.5. Current status at EU level 
There are currently no specific rules at the EU level governing UTPs. This does not mean, 
however that the question of harmonisation has not been the subject of much debate at the 
European level. Already in 2009, the European Commission started to consider UTPs as a 
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potential problem in the food supply chain. Against the backdrop of global food price spikes, 
it published a communication on the ‘Better functioning of the food supply chain in Europe’ 
(COM(2009) 591), mentioning UTPs for the first time. One year later, in 2010, the decision 
was taken to establish the ‘High-level forum for a better functioning food supply chain’ 
(Decision 2010/C 210/03), which eventually resulted in the principles of good practice 
(2011) and the creation of the voluntary Supply Chain Initiative (2013). The work of the 
High-level forum is set to continue until at least 2019 (Decision 2015/C 179/03). In 2013, the 
Commission also published a Green Paper on this UTP (European Commission, 2013). All 
these efforts culminated in another report by the European Commission in 2016 
(COM(2016) 32 final), which outlines the regulatory efforts against UTPs so far and the plans 
for the future. 
The report discusses, among other things, the performance of the SCI and finds generally 
satisfactory results, even though it also calls for its strengthening. With regard to additional 
regulatory efforts, the Commission has stated that it will continue to monitor any new 
developments and opportunities. Several actors already expressed their dissatisfaction with 
this outcome, with especially the European Parliament being particularly in favour of more 
stringent and explicit regulations at the EU level (see the European Parliament resolution of 
7 June 2016 on unfair trading practices in the food supply chain). After another round of 
consultations in 2016, spearheaded by the Agricultural Markets Task Force, set up by the 
Directorate-General Agriculture and Rural Development, the Commission has recently (20 
June 2017) decided to launch an impact assessment with the possibility of UTP rules being 
implemented in the first half of 2018. 
Supply Chain Initiative 
The Supply Chain Initiative (SCI) has been in operation since 2013 and has been launched as 
a consequence of the findings of the High-Level forum for a better functioning food supply 
chain of the European Commission. Already in 2011, the Principles of Good Practice around 
which the SCI is built, were adopted by 11 EU level signatory organizations coming from all 
stages of the food supply chain, including the biggest EU farmers’ union Copa Cogeca. 
However, when the SCI itself was created, several signatory organisations, most notably 
Copa Cogeca, refused to further engage in the direction the EU governance of the issue of 
UTPs was headed (Gentile et al., 2016). These organisations were of the opinion that a 
purely voluntary framework would not be sufficient in reducing the problems associated 
with UTPs. Companies are free to register with the SCI after which they have to follow a set 
of steps before their registration becomes official. Dispute resolution mechanisms are also 
provided: both bilateral and aggregated disputes can be handled. 
Other pieces of legislation 
The rest of the current legal framework at EU level only provides very general rules (mainly 
in relation to competition law) and these rules are rarely applicable to the UTPs as defined 
by the European Commission. The most relevant pieces of EU-level legislation which are 
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commonly recognized as potentially addressing UTPs are the following: Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU (which respectively focus on unfair practices in horizontal competition and on abuses 
of dominant positions, which almost never holds in the food chain); the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive 2005/29/EC (which contains regulation focused on the relationship 
between firms and consumers); Directive 93/13/EC On Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
(also only applicable to relationships between firms and consumers); and the Consumer 
Protection Cooperation Regulation 2006/2004/EC (which coordinates consumer protection 
efforts across Member State borders). None of these regulations include specific UTP 
provisions but they could possibly serve as the basis for any future efforts to regulate UTPs 
at the EU level. 
 
4.6. EU Harmonisation of UTP rules 
With the different elements now in place, we can apply the conceptual framework from 
Section 2 to the specific issue of UTPs. We will go over each of the benefits and costs one by 
one and see to which extent they are relevant in the context of UTPs 
First, with regards to the regulation of transboundary phenomena, an indication can be 
found in Gentile et al. (2016), whose survey shows that 27 % of perceived UTPs have 
occurred between companies located in different countries. While this finding alone is by no 
means sufficient as an argument for EU-wide regulation (and confirms the need for more 
independent research), it is clear that UTPs are not confined within the borders of any EU 
Member State. 
Second, as shown in the previous sections, there is considerable divergence in types of UTP 
regulations between the different Member States. Without any form of EU-wide UTP 
legislation, this effectively means that the location (often of the company applying UTPs) 
determines the stringency of UTP legislation as well as its enforcement (Vaqué, 2014). It is 
not unthinkable that this could lead to situations of regulatory arbitrage. However, it should 
also be noted that instead of a race-to-the-bottom in UTP regulation between countries, it 
seems that there has been more of a race-to-the-top with more and more Member States 
introducing stringent regulation in this field. 
Third, we have shown that in the different Member States, there are currently several 
administrations that concern themselves full-time with the problem of UTPs (just think 
about the example of the GCA in the UK). Needless to say, each of these agencies cost 
money to the taxpayers and if these resources could somehow be (more) centralized at the 
European level, there is an opportunity for economies of scale in administration. 
For the last benefit of EU harmonisation, namely transaction cost savings, it is unclear how 
big they could potentially be in the context of UTPs, especially given the fact that most UTPs 
are already illegal in the different areas of the law. The savings will be largest for the victims 
of UTPs who may not know which practices should be considered as a UTP and which are 
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part of the normal course of action in contract negotiations. Removing this hurdle could 
potentially make suppliers more confident in using the legal system against their buyers, 
thus reducing the ‘fear factor’. 
Turning to the costs of EU harmonisation, it is clear that if the regulatory frameworks in the 
different Member States are an accurate representation of the social optima in those 
countries, the harmonisation costs of EU regulation will be considerable. This is definitely 
true for countries which do not have any specific UTP regulation (as is the case for 
Denmark), but also for countries with more stringent regulation (like France), which 
normally will have to implement the EU rules as well (depending if it is decided to only 
introduce minimum regulation or regulation fixed at a certain level). 
The same is true for switching costs, which in the case of UTPs could be interpreted as the 
cost of switching from one set of UTP rules to an EU-wide set of rules. This would inflict 
considerable costs on all Member States, but especially on those without an applicable legal 
framework (for instance, Denmark). Given that these countries were unwilling to introduce 
rules in the first place, these switching costs might make it even harder to find a consensus 
among all Member States. 
Finally, as mentioned before, there is indeed a real danger of over-regulation in the case of 
UTPs as has been demonstrated by the race-to-the-top that has been building up in the 
recent decade and has mainly been driven by political deliberations rather than hard 
evidence. 
In conclusion, one could argue that most costs and benefits (apart from the race-to-the-
bottom argument) are applicable in the case of UTPs. Their relative importance will 
necessarily depend on further research and consultations. 
Other arguments 
While we believe that this conceptual framework should form the basis of any impact 
assessment of harmonisation at the EU level, there are several other, more specific, 
arguments that have been used for the case of UTPs. Here, we provide an overview of the 
most important ones. 
First of all, the question whether UTPs should be regulated at an EU level of course crucially 
hinges on the fact whether UTPs themselves represent a problem worth regulating with 
specific means (rather than the general legislation that already exists). In other words, it is 
absolutely necessary to find out whether or not UTPs actually represent a market failure 
that merits correction. While the number of Member States having already legislated UTPs 
in a specific manner (see previous sections) would seem to suggest that this is indeed the 
case, there is surprisingly little sound empirical research done on this topic. The research 
that is often cited in this respect comprises two surveys by Dedicated Research, one on 
behalf of CIAA (the European association of the food and drink industry) and AIM (the 
European Brands Association) and one on behalf of Copa Cogeca. In the former, mainly 
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intermediary actors across different industries were surveyed and the results indicated that 
no less than 96 % of respondents had been exposed to UTPs of some form in the past year, 
costing them about 0.5 % of turnover on average (Dedicated Research, 2011). The latter 
survey, which focused more on farmers and on farmer cooperatives, found that UTP-related 
costs amounted to about 2 % of annual costs for that group. A more impartial study, which 
was ordered by the Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and 
SMEs and was performed by Areté, showed that around 47 % of respondents (in a sample 
that comprises actors from all stages of the food supply chain) had experienced UTPs in the 
past five years, of which about one third eventually resulted in a dispute (Gentile et al., 
2016). So, while this last study is already considerably less outspoken in its conclusions than 
the first two cited studies (possibly because of the increase in regulation with respect to 
UTPs between the different studies), it would seem that, at first sight, UTPs do indeed 
represent a significant problem for both farmers and intermediaries in the food sector. Of 
course, this data is all self-reported, so it is clear that more research is required to fully and 
independently answer this question. All in all, the current base of research on the issue is 
insufficient to show that: (1) UTPs represent an issue worth legislating at scale; and (2) EU-
level legislation would represent an added value vis-à-vis the already existing rules at the 
level of the Member State. In fact, it has been shown extensively that buyer’s strong or even 
dominant position would not necessarily translate into abuse of that market power (Dobson 
et al., 2000; McCorriston, 2002; Sexton, 2013). 
Second, while most countries and most actors in the food supply chain agree on the general 
definition of UTPs, there is considerable heterogeneity in which practices Member States 
consider as UTPs. This is evident from the difference in coverage as shown in Tables 1 and 2. 
Moreover, there is also still considerable debate about what should be considered as unfair 
in the food supply chain. Supermarkets, for instance, complain that fairness should not 
mean that their prices should always cover the farmers’ production costs (EU Food Law, 
2017). A European framework of harmonised definitions and descriptions of unfair trading 
practices would surely help to reduce these levels of heterogeneity and uncertainty (which 
is of course related to the transaction cost savings argument). 
Third, the case studies have demonstrated that the ‘fear factor’ is a fundamental part of the 
equation when thinking about legislating UTPs. One way of keeping complaints as 
anonymous as possible for as long as possible would be to aggregate them. If one were to 
create a European mechanism whereby individual complaints against a certain company 
with suppliers in different Member States could be aggregated this would be an effective 
way to deal with the ‘fear factor’. Seeing that the number of official complaints per year in 
each Member State is quite limited (Renda et al., 2014), it cannot be deemed infeasible to 
handle all of them at the European level by a centralised adjudicator. 
Fourth, so far the discussion has focused mainly on European companies, both at the side of 
the buyer and the supplier. However, many companies that engage in UTPs also conduct 
business with companies and farmers located outside of the European Union, many of them 
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in the developing world (Fair Trade Advocacy Office, 2017). Arguably, the problem of UTPs is 
even more severe for those suppliers. For instance, suppliers in developing countries often 
only have one large-scale buyer in their immediate vicinity, which only exacerbates the issue 
of the ‘fear factor’. And even if they should decide to press charges against their buyer, the 
complex regulatory landscape in the EU is almost impossible to decipher for any single 
supplier. A harmonized set of rules and enforcement mechanisms at the EU level would 
make it much easier for suppliers outside of Europe to complain about and take action 
against UTPs inflicted on them by European buyers (higher transaction cost savings). 
Sixth, in the past few years, several legal scholars have raised objections to new EU-wide 
legislation on the topic. For instance, the Max Planck Institute has, in its response to the 
2013 Green Paper, argued that while it is true that there is considerable fragmentation in 
the way UTPs are treated now, introducing specific EU regulation would create a different 
type of fragmentation, namely that of EU regulation itself (Hilty, Henning-Bodewig and 
Podszun, 2013). More specifically, if the EU were to create specific regulation of B2B 
practices, this would add to an already complex set of rules governing competition, making 
the overall system incoherent. Moreover, the Institute also urges the European lawmakers 
to take into account the fact that new EU rules would somehow have to be embedded 
within the different legal traditions of the Member States. And, as shown in the previous 
sections, it is unclear at this point where in the national legislations those rules would have 
to find their place. Finally, more generally, the Institute is concerned new specific 
regulations on B2B contracts would, at least for some practices, be in conflict with the 
freedom to conclude contracts between private actors. All in all, the authors consider 
voluntary initiatives combined with more effective settlement procedures to be the better 
option in dealing with the issue of UTPs. 
In a similar vein, Glöckner (2017) argues that EU regulation is already sufficiently dense and, 
when thinking about regulating UTPs, lawmakers should consider as much as possible 
making amendments to already existing rules, rather than creating new ones. More 
specifically, he believes that a simple extension of the Unfair Terms Directive (93/13/EEC) 
towards B2B contracts might be sufficient. After all, this directive has already been 
integrated into the different national legal systems and as such it would not even be up to 
the EU legislator to take action. He also warns against an overly restrictive focus on the food 
supply chain when designing new European rules. After all, the principle of equal treatment 
dictates that UTP rules should be universally applicable. 
A final legal argument that can be made relates to the different legal traditions in the 
Member States. These systems have been evolving over decades and sometimes even 
centuries, which is clear from the fact that in those places where they are regulated, UTPs 
are part of different branches of the law (see Section 4 for instance). Often, these provisions 
have been fit in the national systems so as to only minimally disturb the existing overall 
balance in the law. In this context, it seems unlikely that a one-size-fits-all approach at the 
EU-level would be the most efficient way in legislating the issue of UTPs. 
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A final argument against specific EU rules on UTPs is related to the already existing Supply 
Chain Initiative. While the experience with the SCI has not been overwhelmingly positive so 
far among the actors of the food supply chain (Gentile et al., 2016), it has not been in 
operation long enough to fully evaluate its effectiveness. If EU regulation on UTPs was 
introduced now, it would effectively render the SCI superfluous. However, with some minor 
adjustments to its governance and its process, it could still remain the basis of the EU UTP 
approach. For that to happen, it is of course crucial that the European farming 
representatives come back on board. Further, new specific EU rules on UTPs would not only 
have an impact on the SCI, but also on those national voluntary initiatives that have 
achieved relative success, such as the one in Belgium. 
 
4.7. Conclusion 
This note has attempted to provide a broad overview of the regulatory aspects which are 
relevant for the issue of UTPs. First of all, we have developed a conceptual cost-benefit 
framework for EU harmonisation. Second, we have demonstrated that the regulatory 
landscape in the EU is considerably fragmented which might present a problem for any 
harmonisation effort on the part of the European authorities. Third, we have looked at 
several case studies from which a couple of interesting takeaways could be distilled. Finally, 
we have considered all the existing arguments in favour and against specific regulation on 
UTPs at the EU level by applying the conceptual framework. 
In anticipation of the results of the European Commission’s impact assessment, we can 
tentatively give some advice to the European lawmakers. However, any meaningful 
conclusion is seriously hampered by the lack of rigorous research into the issue of UTPs. In 
general, we believe there is simply too little evidence to unambiguously conclude that 
specific regulation against UTPs is warranted at all, let alone at the EU level. That being said, 
there is clearly an impetus towards legislation of this issue and there are indeed a couple of 
areas where EU rules could have a role to play. First, clearly define UTPs and provide an 
exhaustive list of what can be considered as such. Second, establish a European adjudicator 
(modelled after the GCA in the UK), which can receive confidential complaints from across 
the Union, aggregate them and then refer them to appropriate national authority, where 
the necessary action and sanctions will be taken. This should not only address the ‘fear 
factor’, but also preserve the regulatory heterogeneity and different legal traditions across 
the Member States. After all, it seems that the rules to regulate UTPs, or at least the most 
blatant ones, do already exist at the level of the Member States. Therefore, we believe it 
would be sufficient to address the ‘fear factor’. Finally, we argue that the SCI should be 
preserved, but not as an organisation primarily focused on UTPs, but more as a platform in 
which the actors from across the food supply chain come together to discuss growth 
opportunities. This should foster more coordination and cooperation vertically and make 
UTPs only one of the discussion points. The SCI should also continue to work together with 
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national authorities on sharpening their definitions of UTPs or guiding the development of 
any voluntary initiatives that are being created or that already exist. 
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Annex: List of UTPs (Source: Renda et al., 2014) 
1. Lack of clarity in contract offer 
2. Lack of written contract 
3. Abuse of economic dependence* 
4. Liability disclaimers 
5. Unilateral modification clauses 
6. Terms unreasonably imposing or shifting risks 
7. Unfair use of confidential information 
8. Unfair use of confidential information after contract expiry 
9. Unfair breaking off of negotiation 
10. Unfair contract termination 
11. Refusal to negotiate 
* Abuse of economic dependence can be invoked to tackle also other UTPs included in the Green Paper, such 
as i.a. retroactive contract changes, unilateral modification clauses, terms unreasonably imposing or shifting 
risks, and the unfair use of confidential information during the contractual relationship. 
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5.1. Introduction 
Regulating unfair trading practices (UTPs) in food supply chains is a challenging task 
reinforced by the complexity of the governance structure and functioning of the food supply 
chains (e.g. domestic supply chains versus EU supply chains versus global chains; large net of 
vertical and horizontal interdependences between players along the chain). The complexity 
of food chains requires a careful empirical and conceptual evaluation on the importance of 
UTPs and whether there is need for regulatory intervention and in what form. However, 
once UTPs are deemed to be a problem, the first key challenge for policy-makers is to 
understand whether there is a need for MS level regulation or an EU-wide approach. 
Naturally, curtail in this respect is to evaluate the benefits and costs of EU harmonisation of 
UTP regulations. The second key challenge is how to ensure the effectiveness of the UTP 
regulations. This involves putting in place an effective enforcement mechanism and 
monitoring system for UTPs to ensure that the regulatory objectives are achieved. 
The aim of this report is to shed some light on these regulatory aspects of UTPs. More 
specifically, it summarises the regulatory aspects of UTPs, both in their current form and 
what they could look like in the future. These regulatory aspects are considered both from 
an economic and from a legal angle. Note that this report does not analyse specific 
measures to address UTPs but provides an overall assessment of policy framework for 
regulating UTPs. The report is based on presentations of Swinnen and Vandevelde (2017), 
Cafaggi and Iamicelli (2017) and Iamicelli and Cafaggi (2017). 
 
5.2. Regulating UTPs: diversity versus harmonisation 
In recent years, there has been a surge in UTP regulation in the different EU Member 
States. (11) However, so far, no specific EU legislation has been implemented apart from a 
voluntary framework. Swinnen and Vandevelde (2017) offer a general conceptual 
framework of EU Harmonisation, before discussing the different UTP regulations and their 
                                          
(
11
) This first section summarises the more elaborate analysis and discussion in Swinnen & Vandevelde (2017), which is added to this 
report. 
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effectiveness at the Member State level, compare them to the current state of EU level UTP 
legislation and finally apply the conceptual framework to the specific case of UTPs. 
The conceptual framework details the (economic) benefits and costs associated with 
harmonisation of regulation, thus using decentralisation as the natural state of the world 
(see, for instance, Tiebout, 1956). 
There are four different potential benefits of harmonisation. 
— The first benefit of harmonisation is that it allows for the regulation of 
transboundary phenomena. Within the European Union, given the size and 
proximity of the different Member States, this is of course an important 
argument. 
— The second benefit of harmonisation is that it is a step in the direction of a 
more complete common market, whereby competition takes place under the 
same conditions. Whereas this is more a political argument, it is intimately 
related to the economic argument of preventing a ‘race-to-the-bottom’ in 
regulation between countries. 
— A third benefit of harmonisation is related to economies of scale in 
administration (Faure 2001). 
— A final, somewhat related, benefit of harmonisation is transaction cost 
savings. Under uniform Community rules firms and citizens must not spend 
on information costs. They do not have to inform themselves about 
differences in the substantive law of the EU Member States and the way in 
which these rules are enforced (Van den Bergh 1998). 
Additionally, there are two types of costs associated with harmonisation: 
— The most important cost associated with harmonisation is under- or over-
regulation, or, in other words, deviating from a country’s social optimum. 
— In addition to deviations from each country’s social optimum, harmonisation 
also involves switching costs, which are the (administrative) costs incurred 
when switching from one set of rules to another. 
The presence of these costs and benefits will depend to a large extent on the variation of 
MS regulations and how these rules have been absorbed by the different actors along the 
food value chain. As a result, Swinnen and Vandevelde (2017) develop a ranking of the UTP 
regulations in the different MS, using a set of seven criteria related to the legal treatment of 
UTPs, how those rules are enforced and which types of UTPs are covered by the legislation 
(see Table 2 in previous chapter). As can be seen in the table, there is considerable 
regulatory fragmentation of UTP regulation across the EU. 
It is important to note that the ranking represents a measure of the stringency of the 
different UTP approaches, but that this is not necessarily correlated with their effectiveness, 
as is evident from Figure 1 (see previous chapter). 
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Swinnen and Vandevelde (2017) make a comparison of the MS legislations with the 
regulation currently in place at the EU level, most notably the voluntary Supply Chain 
Initiative (SCI). They find that it has only been able to achieve limited success, mainly due to 
the lack of support from some important actors along the food value chain (e.g. Copa 
Cogeca). 
Further, when applying the conceptual framework of harmonisation to the specific case of 
UTPs, it is clear that each of the different costs and benefits are relevant to some extent. 
However, it is difficult to precisely measure their relative importance. 
Finally, a detailed analysis of several MS regulatory frameworks (France, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, Belgium and Denmark) suggests: (a) that it is worthwhile to broaden the 
scope beyond UTPs; (b) that the so-called fear factor is key; and (c) that it is often sufficient 
to adapt existing legislation to deal with the issue of UTPs. 
In conclusion, the regulatory landscape in the EU with respect to UTPs is considerably 
fragmented. The conceptual framework presented could form a basis for the discussions of 
EU harmonisation of UTP rules. 
 
5.3. Enforcing UTPs in agrifood supply chains 
Once it is decided that UTPs represent a problem worth regulating, the question remains 
how those rules should best be enforced and monitored and by whom. These questions are 
addressed by Cafaggi and Iamicelli (2017) and Iamicelli and Cafaggi (2017). 
Crucially, they argue that, for the purpose of enforcement and monitoring of UTPs, value 
chains should be the unit of analysis in order to fully address causes and consequences of 
UTPs taking into account interdependences of contractual and non-contractual relationships 
along the chain. Further, the lack of a precise legal definition of a value chain ensures that 
any geographical level (be it domestic, EU-wide or global) can be covered using the value 
chain as the mode of analysis. Of course, in the case of global value chains and UTPs, EU-
officials have to contemplate whether they want to take on a role as global regulators, 
which inherently is a (development) policy question. 
Cafaggi and Iamicelli (2017) go on to focus on the different enforcement mechanisms that 
can be used to tackle UTPs. In particular, they make a distinction between private (through 
voluntary codes or independent dispute resolution mechanisms for instance), judicial (the 
court) and administrative enforcement (the government or so-called administrative 
independent authorities). They argue that there are clear complementarities between these 
different forms of enforcement and that any UTP enforcement strategy will necessarily 
combine elements of each. 
The extent to which this complementarity manifests itself depends on three dimensions: the 
incentives of compliance, the costs of compliance and the nature of remedies and sanctions. 
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With regards to the costs of compliance, it is important to consider who will pay the cost of 
detecting compliance and the cost of non-compliance. Particularly, there exist three 
different logics across the different types of enforcement mechanisms. In the case of 
administrative enforcement, the administration pays while in the case of judicial 
enforcement, those costs are typically borne by the producers (the farmers). Deciding who 
pays not only has important distributional consequences, but will also have ramifications for 
the effectiveness of the enforcement itself. The same applies to the type of remedies and 
sanctions used. More and more, lines are blurring between public and private actors in 
terms of the sanctions and remedies they use. A hybridisation of enforcement mechanisms 
is taking place. Public actors start to adopt reputational sanctions (for instance, blacklists) 
while private actors add legal means to reputational tools to increase the deterrence effect 
of their sanctions. 
Cafaggi and Iamicelli (2017) are in favour of a so-called enforcement triangle in which there 
exists no hierarchy from a legal perspective between the three different enforcement 
mechanisms (judicial, private and administrative enforcement). However, there should be 
room for temporal priorities, depending on the situation. For instance, it could be decided 
that private enforcement is given priority (e.g. arbitration), but that if it does not work, 
enforcement will be implemented by the judicial or administrative authorities. The evidence 
collected at the private stage (for instance, by the Supply Chain Initiative) could then be 
used by the public enforcement mechanisms. Those temporal priorities again depend on 
different drivers such as costs, the fear factor and the effectiveness of enforcement at the 
different levels. 
The same triangle also applies to sanctions. In particular, Cafaggi and Iamicelli (2017) argue 
that fines should be coordinated across the different levels of enforcement in order to avoid 
duplication. The same is true for other (reputational) instruments like black lists. In short, 
there should be coordination across all instruments and not only fines. 
Finally, Cafaggi and Iamicelli (2017) comment on the blurring distinction between 
monitoring compliance (ex-ante) and enforcement mechanisms (ex post). This is explored 
further in the next section. 
 
5.4. Monitoring UTPs for supporting better regulations: What is 
the information we need? What information do we miss? 
Iamicelli and Cafaggi (2017) argue that the purpose of monitoring of UTPs in food value 
chains is twofold. It is a tool for enforcement of the rules concerning UTPs (see previous 
section), but it is also a broader tool for governance of supply chains (ensuring 
coordination). While the former used to belong to the domain of the public sector and the 
latter to the domain of the private sector, both goals have become increasingly 
interconnected, regardless of which actor performs which function. For instance, monitoring 
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over the contractual and organizational changes determined along the chain (at national 
and supra-national level) by the adoption of a new safety control system is now increasingly 
implemented at the legislative or the administrative level (see, for instance, La Charte et le 
Label Relations Fournisseur Responsables, a voluntary scheme created and monitored by the 
French government). 
The question of who shall monitor in turn depends on the objectives of monitoring. 
Monitoring for enforcement was usually conducted by ‘external’ players to the value chain 
(like government) and monitoring for governance by the (private) value chain actors 
themselves, this distinction is becoming less and less useful. Another possible divide could 
be made between first-party (the business under scrutiny), second-party (that business’ 
counterparty like a client or a supplier) and third-party monitoring (independent agencies or 
the government). Here again, hybridisation occurs: when addressing enforcement, 
legislation often encourages the use of codes of conduct and, likewise, compliance 
assurance schemes are often run by independent third parties. An example in the UTP 
context can be found in analysing the Supply Chain Initiative (SCI). While it was conceived as 
a voluntary scheme, its code of conduct has now been adopted as legislation in multiple EU 
Member States. One thing to keep in mind when considering this complementarity is that 
monitoring run by public authorities often suffers from having their scope limited to the 
national dimension. As such, Iamicelli and Cafaggi (2017) conclude that the coordination 
between public and private monitoring systems requires the coordination at the 
supranational level as well. 
Iamicelli and Cafaggi (2017) also identify two ways of monitoring: complaint-based or 
through a continuous assessment process. Due to the risk of retaliation, complaint-based 
monitoring is highly prejudiced by the victim’s reluctance to suffer the consequences of an 
open complaint, occurring whenever the enforcement procedure may not end with an 
amicable solution (the ‘fear factor’). While the possibility of aggregated complaints may 
partially reduce this prejudice, Iamicelli and Cafaggi (2017) advocate a move towards 
continuous assessment procedures. Possible tools for continuous assessment include 
certification schemes, labels and scorecards. They are aimed at following the on-going 
business activity and ensuring the proper compliance regardless of the emergence of a 
dispute or the existence of a specific complaint while at the same time trying to foster 
coordination and cooperation between the actors involved. Some of the major challenges 
facing this mode of monitoring are the allocation of the procedural costs and the 
assessment of the effectiveness of the monitoring. 
In terms of the object of monitoring (i.e. what to monitor), Iamicelli and Cafaggi (2017) 
suggest a holistic and contextual approach. They consider the contract between different 
actors as only one of the elements to be monitored and find that the actual conducts 
(behaviours) are even more important. This also means that all phases of trading relations 
should be subject to monitoring and that the identification of what is considered to be fair 
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or unfair may shift from one context to the other. The assessment of the concrete impacts 
of infringements should form an integral part of monitoring UTPs. 
Finally, Iamicelli and Cafaggi (2017) advocate the use of one particular form of monitoring 
UTPs, namely scorecards. It is a proposal in the domain of voluntary schemes and privately 
regulated initiatives. However, the methodology may also be applied to monitoring schemes 
run by public authorities, although the scope and effects of investigatory and sanctioning 
powers may be different in this case. The scorecard methodology would depend crucially on 
the identification of critical points in business decision-making. These could entail the choice 
of a new supplier, drafting a model contract, choosing a new set of standards, etcetera. 
Next, those practices and procedures should be identified to ensure a fair balance in the 
relations with consumers and suppliers with respect to each critical point. For each of these 
practices and procedures, an actionable metric or modular description should be created 
distinguishing between major and minor measures depending on the critical point. These 
metrics then form the basis of the scorecard. Of course, each scorecard should be 
developed taking into consideration the contextual factors such as the structure and the 
geographical dimension of the supply chain and the size of the different chain participants. 
Procedures should be ensured to be used effectively and an enforcement procedure should 
be embedded in the scorecard methodology, possibly comprising warning procedures, 
‘comply or explain’ rules and/or penalty schemes. Finally, the scorecard should be open to 
self-evaluation by all chain participants. 
Iamicelli and Cafaggi (2017) conclude by saying that there remain several open issues to be 
resolved surrounding their scorecard proposal (should public authorities be involved, who 
will get the benefits, who will pay for it, how does a scorecard address the fear factor, etc.), 
but that this could form the basis of a new way forward both in monitoring and enforcing 
UTP rules. 
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6.1. Introduction 
Unfair trading practices in food supply chain systems have increasingly attracted the 
attention of European policy-makers over the last years. Numerous official documents, 
notably the European Parliament Resolution on imbalances in the food supply chain of 19. 
January 2012, the Green Paper ‘On unfair trading practices in the business-to-business food 
and non-food supply chain in Europe’ issued by the European Commission in 2013, and 
several other documents partially listed at the end of this contribution as well as numerous 
reports to the European Commission, for example the report delivered by the Agricultural 
Markets Task Force (EC, 2016b), illustrate this recent awareness for a long neglected issue. 
There are many reasons that may explain this shift of attention from business-to-consumers 
(B2C) considerations (see Directive EU-2005) to business-to-business (B2B) concerns. In the 
European context, three of them deserve special mention: 
— socioeconomic turmoil in specific sub-sectors, namely dairy milk and pig meat, 
which were partially attributed to unfair trading practices by some parties 
(mainly retailers) due to ‘imbalances of power’; 
— concentration among retailers that fed this perception. According to recent 
data (European Commission, 2014a, p. 40) the top 3 retailers have above 
30 % of shares in food markets in all EU members, with the exception of five 
countries. This concentration has also created dependency of suppliers on this 
small number of buyers. According to a study for the Spanish Competition 
Authority, in that country 40 % of the revenues of suppliers in the grocery 
supply chain was generated by only three retailers in 2010 (EC, 2014b: 11); 
— Globalisation of the same retailers. Within the European Union, ‘Cross-border 
trade between EU Member States now accounts for about 20 % of total food 
                                          
(
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) Correspondence: claude.menard@univ-paris1.fr. This report owes much to the lively and fruitful discussions with the participants to 
the symposium on Unfair Trading Practices in the Food Supply Chain held in Brussels, 17-18 July 2017. I have a special debt with 
Bruno Buffaria, Pavel Ciaian, and Federica Di-Marcantonio for their comments and suggestions on a first draft of this paper. 
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and beverage production in the EU and at least 70 % of the total exports of 
agri-food products of EU Member States are destined to other EU Member 
States’ (European Commission, 2014b). Moreover, many top retailers have 
developed far beyond EU borders. For example, Carrefour operates in more 
than 40 countries, from China to Latin America and has developed complex 
chains of suppliers to meet the variations in demand from these differentiated 
consumers. 
The transfer of attention from B2C to B2B has also involved substantial changes in focus, 
from extended protection of consumers (initially mostly targeting misleading advertising —
see Directive 2005) to a much broader set of issues primarily related to relationships among 
partners and, when it comes to the agri-food sector, among the different links in the supply 
chain systems, as well illustrated by several contributions to this symposium on Unfair 
trading practices in the food supply chain. 
This paper builds on the supports provided by contributors to this symposium and on the 
interventions of participants, complemented by references to recent documents issued by 
or delivered to the European Union authorities and that were part of the background to the 
symposium. The resulting synthesis is organised as follows. The next section introduces 
some preliminary remarks about the difficulties of the topic. The third section takes 
advantage of the different contributions to delineate the issues at stake when exploring 
UTPs in supply chain systems. The fourth section discusses some impact of UTPs and various 
modalities to deal with their consequences, as partially explored in the symposium. The last 
section addresses some policy issues, drawing lessons from these presentations and 
discussions and suggesting possible directions to go further. 
 
6.2. Preliminary remarks 
The limited knowledge available so far about supply chains, their characteristics, their 
governance, and how these properties would provide a particularly favourable compost for 
unfair trading practices is mentioned in several official documents (e.g., in EC, 2014b, 
2016b) and has been pointed out by almost all participants. Let’s quote a few. According to 
Gorton et al. (13), ‘the scale of problem is difficult to assess fully’, and we lack indicators and 
cross-national evidence that would support robust conclusions. Indeed, ‘No general 
conclusions can be drawn regarding the effect of power imbalances in the chain and price 
transmission asymmetries’ (Dries), and there is ‘No consensus about the impact of UTPs on 
consumers’, for example regarding the impact of reverse margin practices and the role of 
middlemen (Russo et al.). Reviewing empirical studies on these issues, Russo et al. even 
show that there are diverging and even opposite results. And when it comes to regulatory 
                                          
(
13
) From now on, all references to names without a date refer to contributions made in the symposium and listed at the end of this 
report.  
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measures, ‘relatively little is known about instruments we should use to overcome problems 
related to UTPs’ (Fałkowski), which may partially explain the skepticism of Sexton regarding 
the introduction of specific regulation. Part of the problem is coming from the 
‘Heterogeneity in what is considered as a UTP’ (Swinnen and Vandevelde). 
In this context, it is difficult to draw conclusive recommendations for policy-makers. For 
example, Sexton endorses a quite radical position, basically arguing that consolidation is our 
future and that we should move away from our obsession with the lack of competition 
resulting from concentration on the retailers’ side and the negative impact it would have on 
farmers since large retailers strategically depend on their suppliers with respect to quality, 
quantity, and timing of deliveries. But Gorton et al. conclude in the opposite direction, 
stating that ‘Buyers are more trustworthy where there is greater competition in the buyer’s 
market.’ 
All in all, there was a general consensus that ‘… more research is needed’ (Swinnen and 
Vandevelde). This awareness of the limited results on which we can build sound analyses 
and relevant policy recommendations at this point is not surprising if we consider: 
— the complexity and variety of arrangements grouped under the label ‘supply 
chain’; 
— the diversity of transactions that are processed in these different 
organisational structures; 
— the increasingly transnational nature of the activities of supply chain systems 
so that they are exposed to natural conditions and institutional rules of the 
game that vary considerably along the chain (EC, 2014a: 42 sq.). 
What does not help to evolve in this fog is the difficulty that so many economists and policy-
makers have to grasp the exact nature of supply chain systems (for a discussion, see Ménard 
2013; 2018). For example, the task force on agricultural markets proposed the following 
concept in its recent report (EC, 2016a, par. 29, P 14): 
‘The supply chain can be seen as a series of consecutive markets involving input 
providers and producers, then producers and processors, then processors and 
wholesalers/traders and finally wholesalers/traders and retailers.’ 
In the view of our discussions, this is plainly wrong: it presumes that there is a price 
mechanism operating independently and sequentially on the different markets of the supply 
chain, thus evacuating the central issue of the governance along the chain, which is at the 
core of most of these arrangements and that makes the pricing issue so sensitive. And 
indeed, this difficulty is implicitly acknowledged a few lines later when it is mentioned that: 
‘The consecutive markets are inter-linked and depend on each other,’ a statement that of 
course would require a quite substantially different approach than one considering each 
‘market’ in isolation. 
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One important result of the contributions to the symposium is that they introduced 
productive discussions among participants about the nature of the phenomena under 
review and pointed out the need for a better conceptualisation of the issues at stake. I now 
turn to some aspects of what we have learned or what in my view could be fruitfully 
developed in that perspective. 
 
6.3. Conceptual clarification 
When it comes to the issue of ‘Unfair trading practices in food supply chain’, almost all 
terms are raising definitional problems and, behind the semantic aspect, problems of 
rigorously identifying what we are tackling, which is of course essential for establishing 
appropriate policies. Almost all contributors faced these problems and provided useful 
insights. Let us turn to some of them sequentially. 
What are UTPs? 
The European Commission has provided a definition of ‘unfair trading practices’, cited 
explicitly by Cafaggi and Iamiceli (2017a) but that provided the background to most 
interventions. Communication Com (2014) 472 Final considered that: ‘UTPs can broadly be 
defined as practices that grossly deviate from good commercial conduct, are contrary to 
good faith and fair dealing and are unilaterally imposed by one trading partner on another.’ 
(EC, 2014b). This definition provides a large umbrella under which can be found a bundle of 
very different problems. 
Sexton took a challenging position with respect to this European Commission approach, 
arguing that ‘there is no agreement on what actions constitute unfair trading practices; 
definitions and examples are often tautological or contain terms that are vague and not 
actionable.’ The conclusion derived from his position is that trading practices in supply chain 
are identical to those in other business arrangements, so that the usual competition rules 
and laws should prevail. The underlying assumption is of course that supply chain systems 
do not differ from other organizational solutions, a point to be discussed below. 
Before doing so, let’s first come back to the general question of ‘unfair trading practices’, 
whatever the organizational arrangement chosen. As many interventions suggested, 
clarifying the terms and dimensions involved may help making progress on the issues at 
stake. 
Trading practices 
When referring to trading practices, we are actually dealing with the classical economic 
problem of the conditions that may challenge the proper exercise of competition, with a 
focus on efficiency. The assumption is that under appropriate market conditions the 
resulting allocation of resources is beneficial to all parties to the transactions. The problem 
is that ‘imbalance of bargaining power is always present in contractual negotiations’ (EC, 
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2014a: 25). Competition policies precisely intend to deal with this issue, which throws 
doubts about the need for specific considerations and regulatory measures regarding supply 
chain. 
An interesting point made by Bruno Buffaria in his introduction to the symposium is that 
although this imbalance is a frequent component of commercial practices, generating 
uncertainties among traders that would not exist otherwise, some of these uncertainties 
might be specific to, or more consequential in supply chain (see also EC, 2016b: 12). Beside 
uncertainties endogenous to all transactions (‘commercial practices’), other sources of 
uncertainties may indeed play a particular role in the development of asymmetries among 
transactors in supply chain. Some are embedded in the very nature of these organizational 
arrangements. In one of its most extensive document about unfair trading practices in 
supply chain, the European Commission noted that ‘Recent studies show that contractual 
practices in the retail sector strongly depend on the governance of the supply chain.’ (EC, 
2014a: 42). Indeed, a key issue in supply chain is that governance is spread over different 
partners located at different nodes in the chain, partners that must cooperate while being 
simultaneously competitors (Ménard, 2013). Moreover, exogenous sources of uncertainties 
can amplify imbalance among parties to a supply chain as well as among supply chains that 
operate and compete in the same sector. For example, imbalance can be accentuated by 
institutional factors, as when disparities among regulation across Member States introduce 
biases in B2B parties (EU, 2005, 2016a; Swinnen and Vandevelde). Other sources of 
imbalance can be rooted in technological (e.g., diffusion of innovations) or environmental 
factors (weather, climate, soil), aspects that are barely mentioned in official documents (but 
see EC, 2014a, Chapter 1 for a reference to the role of technology) and, unfortunately, were 
almost totally absent from our discussion. 
In sum, a first lesson from the symposium is that there are many different sources of 
‘imbalance of bargaining power’, with a resulting diversity of outcome (Gorton et al.). There 
is the need to better understand this diversity and to take it into consideration in order to 
draw adequate policies, avoiding the ‘one-size-fits-all’ syndrome (EC, 2014a). 
Unfair practices 
The key question for the purpose of the symposium was of course to determine whether 
such sources of asymmetries are generating unfair practices. Unfairness is a difficult concept 
to define. As already mentioned, in the economic context under review the European 
Commission refers to UTPs as ‘practices that grossly deviate from good commercial conduct, 
are contrary to good faith and fair dealing and are unilaterally imposed by one trading 
partner on another.’ (EC, 2014b: 2). The relative vagueness of the concept may explain the 
paucity of economic literature on B2B unfair trading practices (Sexton). Using a set of 
keywords (unfair, fairness, justice, power, among others), Gorton et al. (2017) were able to 
identify only 45 papers that significantly relate to the topic. As we will see below, none is 
very conclusive about the existence and actual impact of UTPs. 
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Numerous examples provided by contributors and participants fall in one or the other 
categories of unfair practices introduced in the Green Paper (EC, 2013) and refined or 
commented in several documents that followed. In its ‘Communication’ on Tackling unfair 
trading practices in the business-to-business food supply chain, the European Commission 
summarized ‘the main categories of UTPs’ as follow (EC, 2014b: 5): 
— a trading partner’s retroactive misuse of unspecified, ambiguous or incomplete 
contract terms; 
— a trading partner’s excessive and unpredictable transfer of costs or risks to its 
counterparty; 
— a trading partner’s use of confidential information; 
— the unfair termination or disruption of a commercial relationship.’ 
An additional item is introduced in the same document, ‘Territorial supply constraints,’ as 
when suppliers are dependent on local markets and the dominant retailers operating in 
their area, which is often the case with fresh products. Variations or complements have also 
been introduced in official documents (see particularly EC, 2014a, chap. 1; EC, 2016b) with 
interesting interpretations, for example the idea that many of these misconducts and their 
impact on one partner can be understood as imposing ‘switching costs’, equivalent to 
creating barriers to entry, particularly if transaction-specific investments have been made 
on one side of the relationship (Williamson, 1985; Gorton et al.), or if one party depends on 
technology or know-how of the other, or if substantial part of its sales depends on one 
buyer, or if the holder of a reputed brand impose sunk costs on the party that intend to use 
this brand (EC, 2014a, chap. 1). There is also some emphasis in many documents on the so-
called ‘fear factor’, coming out of repeated transactions with the same partner and the fear 
to damage the relationship, which leads to non-action from the victim of the abuse, making 
this mischief particularly difficult to reveal and assess. 
In the symposium, several contributors illustrated these different categories with examples 
(Sexton; Gorton et al.; Russo et al.) and some added complements, e.g. Gorton et al. who 
emphasized the potential role of crisis that may push a powerful partner towards unfair 
practices to compensate ‘sudden loss in profitability’ or the possible transfer on one partner 
of risks associated to specific investments à la Williamson; or Dries who explored the 
possible role of asymmetric price transmission. A very interesting reinterpretation was 
submitted by Cafaggi and Iamiceli (2017a) who listed unfair practices according to the time 
at which they interfere in a commercial relation. They propose to look at the unfair practices 
at: (1) the time of access to the relation (equivalent to entry fees and barriers); (2) the pre-
contractual phase, for example when one party provides misleading information during the 
negotiation; (3) the time when clauses are determined, with the introduction of unfair 
clauses; (4) the moment of execution of the contract, as when payments are unduly 
delayed; (5) the possibility of unfair termination or disruption; and (6) the post-contractual 
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phase, as when one party unduly uses confidential information. What is interesting in that 
‘timing’ of unfair practices is that they may command different policies and may require to 
be monitored through different institutional arrangements. 
However, as pointed out upfront by Sexton in his opening contribution, all examples listed 
tend to remain relatively descriptive, without providing a well-defined path towards a much 
needed theory that would allow dealing with two unanswered questions: 
(1) How much do these unfair practices differ from the usual strategic behaviour in 
B2B businesses (an issue also mentioned by Fałkowski)? Surprisingly, few 
contributors emphasised or discussed the possible role of ‘concentration’ and 
‘consolidation’, which are measurable factors and potentially the main sources of 
this ‘imbalance of bargaining power’ that would encourage behavioural practices 
leading to inefficiencies and negative impact on operators, typically small farmers, 
who would otherwise be commercially viable (EC, 2016b). 
(2) And what about the very idea of ‘unfairness’? How far can we go in restricting 
ourselves to a purely economic approach to a phenomenon that clearly refers also to 
other dimensions? 
Unfairness 
Indeed, all of the above presume that UTPs matter because they distort ‘economic 
practices’, therefore impacting essentially the efficiency of market arrangements and the 
resulting allocation of resources. But there is more to ‘unfairness’. As emphasised by 
Fałkowski, ‘unfair’ is also about perception, which refers to social norms and values. This 
point of view is in contrast with the position of Sexton who recommends sticking to an 
economic approach according to which there are only ‘two goals in any commercial 
relationship: (i) maximise the total value (surplus) from the relationship; (ii) obtain as large 
of a share of that surplus as you can.’ 
However, focusing exclusively on these goals raises two questions: (1) Can we really analyse 
adequately UTPs if we limit ourselves to this approach? (2) Can we ignore the 
socioeconomic impact UTPs can have through their effect on redistribution? Most 
contributors to the symposium, as well as participants, more or less explicitly agreed that 
beside efficiency issues strictly speaking, there is also the effectiveness dimension to take on 
board, which exceeds the pure allocation effect and introduces the political economy of 
UTPs. In that respect, the debates were consistent with a position developed in a report to 
European Commission by the Agricultural Markets Task Force, which stated that: ‘The future 
of the CAP and the farming sector depend on societal support. Today’s consumers are 
interested in safe and sustainable agricultural production which also does justice to local 
traditions. Classical market mechanisms do not provide adequate incentives to ensure 
sustainable production’ (EC-2016b: 11). Although the statement focuses on the end point of 
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the supply chain (consumers), it could easily be extended to the ‘societal support’ needed 
from and for other links in the supply chain. 
There are sound economic motives to take redistribution effects and their perception on 
board, whether this perception is right or wrong. The very small ‘farm share in the food 
dollar’ noted by Dries is a typical example of a source of such perception. Perception of 
unfairness can have significant impact on costs. We know since the pioneering study of cash 
posters in the 1930s and the lessons that Akerlof (1982) drawn from this experiment that 
perception of market conditions has an impact on behaviour and performance, what 
Fałkowski calls ‘network effects’ and that I would prefer to identify as ‘spillover effects’. But 
political transaction costs are also involved, that is: the costs of building sustainable political 
coalitions to support effective public policies by creating a perception of ‘fairness’. 
Indeed, beside their role in guaranteeing or trying to restore ‘the right conditions’ for 
markets to run smoothly (Sexton), economic policies are also about keeping or restoring 
socioeconomic cohesion, which may facilitate coordination and improve performance along 
the supply chain. 
A second important lesson of the symposium is therefore that ‘perception’, rooted in social 
norms, values and beliefs must be taken into account if a policy is to be effective. 
What are supply chains? 
Part of the difficulties in defining and implementing such policies may come from our 
deficient knowledge of what a supply chain is and how it works. As noted in the 
introduction, the definition of supply chain as a sequence of relatively autonomous and 
well-delineated markets is misleading. Supply chains exist precisely because coordinating 
exclusively (or even primarily) through the price mechanism is not satisfying. And 
symmetrically, consolidation, typically vertical integration, is not always the appropriate 
answer to the efficient organization of transactions, as we have learned from transaction 
costs economics (Gorton et al.; Swinnen and Vandervelde). For example, are concentration 
and consolidation the most efficient solutions for dealing with situations that are multi-
dimensional, as with the role of multi-function in agriculture? 
One important lesson from transaction cost economics is that there are organizational 
alternative to integration within a firm and to pure market arrangements, organizational 
solutions that recent literature often identifies as ‘hybrids’ (for surveys see Ménard, 2004, 
2013). Supply chain in the vertical sequence bringing food from producers to consumers, or 
franchising in the horizontal arrangements developed in distribution are epitomized 
illustrations of such alternative arrangements. 
Most participants to the symposium, with the possible exception of a few, apparently 
assumed the existence and legitimacy (from an economic point of view) of such non-
standard organisational arrangements. However, beside a few references to transaction 
cost economics, there were few analyses of the nature and diversity of these arrangements. 
75 
A third lesson here is that beside the acknowledgement of the ‘heterogeneity in what is 
considered as a UTP’ (Swinnen and Vandevelde), we need to know much more about the 
logic and heterogeneity of supply chain systems in which such unfair practices are 
embedded and that could be curbed if adequate policies are drawn and implemented. 
 
6.4. What consequences of UTPs thus understood? 
Notwithstanding these gaps and flaws in our knowledge of supply chain, the symposium 
provided numerous useful insights on the room these arrangements open to UTPs as well as 
on the various institutional modalities through which UTPs can be dealt with. I hereafter 
summarise these two aspects, the impact of UTPs and their regulation and/or monitoring, 
thus paving the way to indications on policy challenges and lessons that can be derived from 
the different angles chosen by our contributors or raised in the discussions. 
What effect on whom? 
Through the variety of contributions to the symposium, different facets of UTPs were 
pointed out with their potential impact on actors, namely: farmers, consumers, and other 
stakeholders; but also on market structures, on different segments of supply chains and 
other organisational arrangements, and on the society as a whole. A fourth lesson from the 
symposium is that we need to look at these different categories through different lenses 
since the impact varies and the methodology to analyse it may require different tools, as the 
short survey of various methodological approaches by Gorton et al. suggested. 
Most presentations focused on the impact of UTPs on farmers, a major concern in Europe 
(but apparently not that much in the US, according to Sexton). Indeed, many contributions 
relied explicitly or implicitly on a two players’ game approach, with retailers on one side and 
farmers on the other. However, the attention mostly went one way, looking at the impact 
on farmers of concentration on the retailing side. There is of course much concern about 
the ‘crowding-out effect’ (Fałkowski), that is: the dramatic reduction in the number of 
farmers in the EU, although it was argued in the discussions that this evolution would have 
happened even under fair trade, due to productivity gains and technological changes. 
Whether or not UTPs played a role in this evolution, eliminating farmers that would have 
otherwise been able to pursue normal activities remains an issue. Beside this potential 
impact, other effects were mentioned, on investments, incentives, and productivity, with 
the argument that unfair practices have a negative impact on each of these variables (EC, 
2014b). For example, in their fierce competition among each other, retailers might 
introduce incentives that push farmers towards unfair practices, e.g. diluting milk with 
water if price is based on volume or artificially increasing fat in pork if price is based on fat 
content. 
However, a supply chain involves more than two players, and the impact of UTPs exceeds 
that on farmers. Cafaggi and Iamiceli (2017a) accurately argued that we want to understand 
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the possible distortions and biases in the entire chain of transactions linking interdependent 
actors, which is the central characteristic of supply chain. In the same vein, Fałkowski noted 
that UTPs can also affect the relationships between retailers and processors, or may have 
their origin in farmers’ behaviour as well. 
In that respect, it is important to consider the potential impact of UTPs downward (on 
markets) and upward (on the general organisation of activities in agriculture). Downward, 
different contributors and participants mentioned the consequences of UTPs on 
competition, with the combination of accelerated exit of suppliers (see above) and the 
development of barriers at entry for potential competitors, the high concentration among 
retailers benefiting the dominant strategies of those in place. Other consequences have 
been suggested on the quality of information and products, although empirical studies on 
these aspects are far from conclusive (Russo et al.). 
Indeed, one of the most challenging contributions with respect to downward effects might 
have been that of Russo et al. on the impact of UTPs on consumers. They examined several 
papers that intended to measure the effect of UTP on consumers through numerous 
variables (on consumers’ welfare through effects on prices and quantity; on quality; on food 
safety). In all cases there were at best ambiguous results: the studies diverged significantly 
in their theoretical predictions as well as in their empirical content, because the results 
depend so much on assumptions made about market structure, industry conduct, and 
model parameters. This is confirmed by Dries who examined price transmission in supply 
chain systems. However, there was some consensus in the discussions that overall, 
competition among retailers play a positive role, that is, a role favourable to consumers, so 
that high concentration should be a concern (but this was challenged by Sexton who argued 
that it is loose oligopsonies that cause problems). 
Another interesting aspect discussed in the symposium was about the potential effect of 
UTPs on the organization of the sector. First, it was mentioned that UTPs can have a 
‘network’ (or spillover) effect (Fałkowski), due to the very nature of this mode of 
organization, diffusing good or bad practices through one specific chain as well as among 
other supply chains. Second, UTPs might play a role in dramatically influencing the balance 
of power and the modalities of organization in the sector. There was an underlying and 
vigorous debate here, between those considering that concentration and consolidation 
among retailers is a ‘natural’ movement in the context of technological change and 
globalization (Sexton) and those who emphasized lessons from recent developments in 
organization theory according to which there is not one single way to efficiently organize 
transactions (Ménard, 2004; 2013). If similar transactions can be organised in alternative 
arrangements that perform similarly well, then there might be value in policies that 
maintain competition among these alternatives, e.g., securing the role of producers’ 
organisations, cooperatives, etc. It was also argued in the discussion that competition 
among alternative organizational solutions may be a good thing for economic growth, so 
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that it might be important for policy-makers to maintain conditions of a levelled field in that 
respect. 
This seems to have been part of the argument behind the reform of common agricultural 
policy (CAP) from 2013, with the acceptance and even encouragement for farmers to get 
organized so as to restore symmetry among parties in the supply chain (EC, 2013b; 2016b: 
6). There was agreement among participants that there is an increasing interdependence 
among the different ‘nodes’ in supply chains, that is: between buyers (retailers), suppliers 
(farmers), as well as processors, but that this movement has been accompanied by a shift 
towards the dominance of retailers. Hence the question raised in this context of the debate 
mentioned above: is consolidation, ultimately leading to quasi-integration and allowing 
retailers to impose their own conditions to all other nodes, the best way to organize 
activities in agriculture? If so, a provocative argument would be that this evolution may end 
in a ‘privately planned economy’, with a tiny group of retailers planning the entire chain 
and, in last resort, the entire agricultural activity at least in some sub-sectors? Is there not 
some economic as well as social value, in the long run, in the coexistence of alternative 
organizational arrangements to such concentration (e.g., cooperatives)? And if so is there a 
need for regulation to provide institutional support in this direction? Or are the ‘Rules of 
Reason in anti-trust law’ — US style — enough to handle this situation, as argued by Sexton? 
Behind this discussion about the appropriate organisation of agriculture and agricultural 
markets, there is the issue of the impact of UTPs on all stakeholders and the society as a 
whole. Economists capture this aspect through welfare effects. Unfortunately, as already 
mentioned concerning the contribution from Russo et al., the effects of concentration and 
consolidation of retailers on the development of UTPs and on welfare are not obvious at all. 
This lack of conclusive results leaves room for diverging positions. For example, Sexton 
challenged the existence of these effects. The point he made is that when retailers are a few 
and are involved in tough competition against each other, they become very dependent on 
the reliability of their suppliers, so that they have incentives to implement fair contracts 
with farmers. In a similar vein, he challenged the idea of a negative effect of concentration 
and consolidation on exit of small farmers. He argued that it is not so since the renunciation 
of so many small farmers means that only those with good performance survive, which 
should be socially beneficial. 
Clearly most of these issues remain open. It is so partially because of the many 
methodological problems that researchers face when it comes to identifying UTPs and 
measuring their impact (Gorton et al.). We need more robust economic results. A fifth 
lesson of the symposium is therefore that on the one hand a better characterization of 
supply chain systems and of their diversity is required; and on the other hand, that there is 
the need for rigorous comparative assessment of the differences and respective 
performance of alternative modalities of governance (for example, comparing supply chain 
led by retailers with those led by cooperatives or by producers’ organisations). 
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How to deal with these issues? 
Because of our limited knowledge about supply chains and their impact, the usual question 
about the role of regulation becomes even more acute. Following the tradition developed in 
industrial organisation, which is largely based on the standard representation of integrated 
firms competing against each other, Sexton questioned the need for a regulation of supply 
chain. In his view the so-called ‘rule of reason in US antitrust law,’ relying upon general laws 
and courts in charge of their implementation should do the job (14). He also argues that the 
need to integrate asymmetries of information among parties to a supply chain can be done 
through the development of contracts (a position also shared by some European 
Commission reports — e.g. EC, 2014a, 2016a), with conflicts handled under existing 
contract/commercial law. 
However, this position does not fully solve two main issues raised by unfair trading practices 
(and not only in supply chains). First, if the different nodes of supply chain correspond to 
relatively autonomous markets, as it has been argued (EC, 2016b), how can (incomplete) 
contracts overcome asymmetries in market power better than the standard price 
mechanism? How come that the price mechanism does not do the job? Second, what about 
the transaction costs of establishing contracts detailed enough to face these asymmetries 
and to prevent or solve conflicts among parties without introducing rigidities that would 
hampered the much needed adaptation in a rapidly changing world? 
Moreover, if it is acknowledged that most contracts are incomplete (EC, 2013b:6), a position 
increasingly shared among economists after the path breaking contributions of Williamson 
(1985, Chapter 3) and Hart and Moore (1988), what mechanisms (15) of governance can fill 
the blanks? The task force on markets in agriculture submitted a distinction ‘between 
contracts between individual primary producers and their respective trading partners and 
contracts which are negotiated by producers collectively with their downstream partner(s)’ 
(EC, 2016b: 34). This distinction might be useful in other aspects (e.g. to better understand 
the role of collective organisations), but it can hardly provide an answer to the problems of 
incompleteness and its connection to the asymmetries between retailers and farmers, 
particularly when it comes to ‘individual contracts,’ notwithstanding the possible exception 
of some very large corporate farms to which Sexton seems to refer in support of his 
arguments against regulation. 
These issues of asymmetries in information and bargaining power and the door they open 
to UTPs remind us that economic activities are social constructs (Fałkowski). There is no 
such a thing as a ‘natural market’. All markets and all organisations result from social 
choices, embedded in guiding rules that require institutional devices to be implemented. 
                                          
(
14
) For a critical view, see Joskow (2002). 
(
15
) In this paper, ‘mechanisms’ are understood as the procedures through which coordination and monitoring are processed, and 
‘devices’ as the organisms through which mechanisms operate. For example, a regulation is a mechanism; a regulatory agency is a 
device. 
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This is why, notwithstanding the variety of forms they take, there are regulatory authorities 
monitoring agriculture everywhere in the world, whatever the political regime. 
What regulation, under what form? 
Indeed, with a few exceptions (e.g., Sexton), there was a general agreement in the 
symposium, synthesized by Cafaggi and Iamiceli (2017a) that regulatory authorities and 
other monitoring devices are needed to enforce rules concerning UTPs, preventing their 
harmful consequences, following-up complaints etc., and that this requires most of the time 
such devices to be external to the direct players of the game. Some ‘regulatory’ tools might 
be provided from inside, through the governance of supply chains, for example product 
safety control systems operated by the chain ‘leader’ or through the instalment of forms of 
audit internal to the chain. However, the need for regulation and arbitration external to the 
parties remain quite universal in agriculture because of its impact on health and, in last 
resort, on the survival of human beings. As a result, we find most of the time what Cafaggi 
and Iamiceli call ‘contamination’ between public monitoring (‘enforcement’ in their 
vocabulary) and private one (‘governance’). 
Several ‘regulatory’ alternatives were considered in different contributions, among which 
competition laws and the role of courts emphasized by Sexton are only one form and one 
that often imposes too high transaction costs. Other arrangements exist, that range from 
purely private to entirely public. One form that has received recent attention from the 
European Commission is purely private (European Commission, 2016b). The Supply Chain 
Initiative (SCI) is based on entirely voluntary participation. Developed initially in Belgium 
with some success, it is tentatively implemented in a handful of countries, with mix results 
so far, particularly because by nature the initiative suffers from the absence of credible 
enforcement mechanism (16). 
This may explain the evolution in UK from private initiatives to a more formal institution, the 
UK Groceries Code Adjudicator, which mainly relies on reputational effect through the 
capacity of the Adjudicator to investigate and publicize unfair practices (Gorton et al.), thus 
operating in a sense as a semi-public certification device. It is also a formal solution in that it 
is backed by a legal framework and the existence of efficient courts. Another and possibly 
complementary option that has been recently favoured by the European Commission is 
monitoring market failure through contracts, a solution that play an important role 
(although often overstated) in the US (MacDonald and Korb, 2011; Ménard, 2018) and that 
Sexton seemed to view as a second best. However, as noticed by the European Commission 
(2014a: 30), contracts need to be enforced through access to the judiciary at reasonable 
cost, a condition not at all obvious and that makes contracts more than a purely private 
solution to UTPs. Less formal, at least from a legal point of view, but susceptible of 
                                          
(
16
) The SCI was formally initiated in November 2011. Its first significant contribution was a set of ‘Principles of good practices’ issued in 
Sept 2013 (see European Commission, 2016b). National platforms are already established (in Belgium) or emerging (as of November 
2015: in Finland, Germany and the Netherlands). For a survey of the contrasted results of SCI, see European Commission, 2016b: 9 
et seq.  
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disciplining parties is the possible role of community-based management to which Fałkowski 
alluded, although no specific example has been provided with respect to UTPs in agriculture 
(but one could argue that the Supply Chain Initiative partially falls into this category). In a 
similar vein, Dries mentioned the possible role of cooperation as a way to monitor unfair 
practices and, above all, to improve existing positive practices. She gives the example of 
powerful retailers cooperating with upstream suppliers to introduce innovation, improve 
production practices, and better respond to consumers’ demand. 
The sixth and fundamental lesson here is that we must acknowledge that there are 
alternative modalities of ‘regulation’ to monitor relationships among the ‘nodes’ in supply 
chains. There is a related lesson however, which is that each of these modalities involves 
significant transaction costs, so that valuing one solution rather than another one should be 
assessed by taking these costs into consideration. Most policy-makers and even economists 
do not seem to be even aware of this issue. At best, there are vague references to the need 
to assess costs and benefits of regulatory modalities in a comparative way. It is a pity that 
this ignorance or ‘benign neglect’ of an issue clearly deserving in-depth investigation still 
persists. 
Looking at regulatory devices from a different perspective 
A major difficulty in assessing alternative modalities of regulation in a comparative way 
comes from their deep institutional embeddedness. Although progress has been made in 
the analysis of institutions and their impact on regulatory issues (see North, 1990; Levy and 
Spiller, 1994; Laffont, 2005; and many others), finding ways to compare institutional 
arrangements, not to speak of evaluating them, remains an important task on the agenda of 
economists and social scientists. Several contributors and discussants pointed out this issue. 
One possible step in that respect can be through a better identification of the different 
institutional layers to which different modalities of monitoring and regulation belong, thus 
easing the development of rigorous comparative analyses. 
Indeed, ‘institutions’ are a bit like supply chains in that they rely on different ‘nodes’ or 
layers. Most discussions on regulation have so far focused on two layers: the macro-
institutional level at which rules of the game are decided (e.g., European Parliament–
Council–Commission; this is the level on which Sexton’s view of regulation focuses), and the 
micro-level at which actors operate within these rules (typically the level at which parties to 
supply chains interact). However, as argued by Cafaggi and Iamiceli (2017a, b), most 
regulatory arrangements are hybrids: they are embedded in legal rules defined at the 
macro-level, and they involve forms of participation of actors operating at the micro-level. 
This reasoning can be push further. It can be argued (and there is some analogy with 
organisation theory here) that these ‘hybrid’ institutions form a category of their own, 
providing the missing link between the general rules (macro-level) and the level of actors 
who must organize their transactions within these rules. It has been suggested to identify 
this intermediate institutional layer as that of ‘meso-institutions’ (Ménard, 2008, 2014). The 
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British ‘Groceries code adjudicator’ illustrates: its responsibilities are embedded in the legal 
‘Grocery supply code of practice’ and it monitors possible unfair practices in groceries 
supply chains through a reputation mechanism, mainly by identifying and publicising good 
and bad practices (Gorton et al.; EC, 2014a). Using reputation as a monitoring instrument 
also plays a role in dealing with the so-called ‘fear factor’, the fear to lose future business 
transactions that often prevents farmers (or other victims of UTPs) to complain (Swinnen 
and Vandevelde; EC, 2014a,b). 
The case of the Adjudicator is only an illustration of the various institutional mechanisms of 
regulation that correspond to ‘meso-institutions’. Actually, most presentations and 
discussions in the symposium focused on this intermediate level, the key role of which has 
been pointed out by the task force on agricultural markets that noted that: ‘Member States 
have appointed different national enforcement authorities to address UTPs. This is 
sometimes the national competition authority and in other cases a dedicated body, such as 
a national ministry, a national food agency, or a national anti-fraud agency.’ (EC, 2016b: 6). 
The importance of this intermediate layer in translating the general rules into specific ones 
and in enforcing these rules has been emphasised by Cafaggi and Iamiceli (2017a). It is likely 
at this level that many sources of efficiency (or inefficiency) originate. A seventh lesson 
from the symposium is that we need to better understand, characterise, and assess the 
comparative costs and benefits of these alternative meso-institutions. 
 
6.5. Policy-making: what did we learn? 
This short summary of the contributions to this rich symposium raises the central issue for 
policy-makers: how can UTPs be monitored at the lowest possible cost so as to reduce, if 
not eliminate, their impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of agricultural markets? This 
is clearly the most difficult part to deal with in this synthesis of our discussion. 
In his contribution, Sexton mentioned that Europeans seem much more concerned than 
Americans by UTPs in supply chain systems. That might be path dependent and not relevant 
only for Europeans. Although there remains a very large number of small farms in the US, in 
many major subsectors the actual production at the farm level and processing at the 
transformation level are highly concentrated (e.g. sugar beets, dairy products, livestock such 
as poultry or hogs — See MacDonald and Korb, 2011; and USDA, 2012), so that there is 
some symmetry between producers, processors, and retailers. By contrast, in Europe as in 
other parts of the world (Africa, Asia), production is much more dispersed while retailing 
and distribution is often highly concentrated. This may make supply chains a much more 
relevant issue and the risk of unfair practices a much more acute problem in those parts of 
the world (17). 
                                          
(
17
) However, one could argue that even in the US this may be changing: globalisation means that an increasing part of the products 
delivered to American consumers through large retailers comes from thousands of small producers dispersed over the world, so 
that coordination on quality, quantity, and timing of deliveries also becomes a major issue. The Nestlé model implemented to 
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Since the structural characteristics of supply chain in Europe, with high concentration of 
retailers and dispersed farmers, are likely going to remain quite the same for the 
foreseeable future, what lessons can be drawn from our discussion that are relevant for 
policy-makers? 
All tools have their own limitation 
One important lesson from the symposium is that there is no single tool that would provide 
the optimal solution to UTPs. 
— Giving access to information cannot do it all. This solution is repeatedly 
mentioned in several European Commission reports on UTPs. Sexton’s skepticism 
towards regulation rely on the assumption that ‘Under the right market 
conditions …’ (18), of which information is a key factor, self-regulation of markets will 
work. The problem is that appropriate information is scarce, difficult and costly to 
collect, and that processing the information already available faces the bounded 
capacity of agents and the distortions coming out of their ‘perception’. 
— Contracts cannot do it all. The increasing attention paid to contracts as a way to 
overcome UTPs might well have generated too high expectations. We have learned 
from contract theory as well as from empirical studies that contracts face limitations 
due to the conditions of negotiation (asymmetry in bargaining power) and the limits 
and costs of writing detailed contracts (collecting adequate information, establishing 
detailed clauses that can apply to a variety of situations, etc.). As a result, most 
contracts are incomplete. Moreover, detailed contracts may improve security for 
partners, but at the cost of introducing major rigidities, making adaptation to a 
changing environment particularly difficult (see EC, 2016b: 29). 
— Private codes of conduct cannot do it all, as illustrated by the initial UK 
experience of a code of conduct that evolved towards the more formal institutional 
arrangement impersonated in the creation of an institutional ‘Adjudicator’. Similarly, 
the Supply Chain Initiative faces the reluctance of key stakeholders to participate, 
particularly because of the lack of adequate mechanisms of enforcement of the rules 
agreed upon. 
— Formal public regulation cannot do it all either. Critiques have well substantiated 
the many distortions and counterproductive biases it can introduce, so that 
‘countries need to be very cautious when considering regulations that are likely to 
make their agricultural sector less efficient’ (Sexton). This risk is particularly high 
when goals assigned to regulatory authorities are socially-politically determined, 
leading to a ‘benign neglect’ for efficiency considerations, a significant risk in policy-
                                                                                                                                 
accompany the development of Nescafe is illustrative in that respect. 
(
18
) The exact quote is: ‘Under the right market conditions, more highly concentrated procurement markets perform best and insure 
farmers a fair or competitive return on investment.’ Based on this principle, Sexton derived several considerations about the 
occurrence and impact of UTPs.  
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making (an illustration could be the debatable recommendation to make collective 
negotiation mandatory — EC, 2016b: 39). 
A lesson from these limitations could well be that a superior solution requires mixing 
different tools. 
The need to know more 
However, doing that in an appropriate way requires to acknowledge the variety of supply 
chain and of regulatory devices and to know their different properties and characteristics. 
As already pointed out in this summary of the symposium and in the various contributions 
and discussions on which it is built, we still have a very limited knowledge in that respect. 
There are important lessons here as well. 
— We need to know better the diversity of supply chain systems, their 
characteristics, and their weight in the different subsectors of agriculture. Building a 
differentiated approach to capture this diversity and substantiating it with relevant 
data is central for an adequate regulation. A step in this direction could be the 
implementation of an observatory of supply chain systems. 
— We need to better understand the variety of regulatory mechanisms and devices 
and to develop criteria to assess their comparative performance in relation to the 
type of activities (transactions) and the type of supply chains they intend (or 
pretend!) to monitor. Such developments require theoretical progress that might be 
encouraged by creating appropriate research programmes at the EU level. 
— We need to take on board the two dimensions involved in UTPs: efficiency and 
effectiveness. Efficiency requires looking at alternative regulatory instruments 
through comparative lenses, for example comparatively assessing the risk that 
formal regulation raises transaction costs, reduces gains to trade, and prevents 
mutually beneficial agreements; versus the risk that relying exclusively on private 
initiatives remain good wishes without adequate tools to effectively enforce codes of 
conduct, thus opening room to opportunistic behaviour and social conflicts. This is 
precisely where effectiveness comes into the picture: it requires the implementation 
of rules favouring fairness and the perception it is so. Building institutional devices 
that facilitate the development of consensus, e.g., public forum involving the 
different stakeholders and relying on transparency in decision-making process and 
accountability in the implementation of rules might be important steps in this 
direction. Notwithstanding its limitation, the Supply Chain Initiative illustrates. 
Still, some relevant lessons already 
What we have learned already and what is now acknowledged by policy-makers is that 
there is a diversity of possible solutions, whether it concerns the organisational 
arrangements that can structure a chain of transactions, of which supply chain is a key 
component beside other arrangements such as vertical integration; or the institutional 
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arrangements that can guarantee a level playing field to parties involved. What we have also 
learned, although our knowledge in that respect remains very limited, is that each solution 
carries its own costs and limitations. 
Finding the right equilibrium between these different solutions is and will remain very 
challenging. Policing and if possible preventing UTPs in supply chain must meet different 
goals, among which: 
(a) maintaining a competitive agriculture in globalised markets; 
(b) facing volatility (in prices, in quantities), sometimes accentuated by this 
globalisation, with its important socioeconomic consequences, particularly on small 
farmers; 
(c) accepting that in the European context consolidation into huge corporate farms 
(which could restore some symmetry among parties in supply chains) will remain a 
very limited option, due to social, geographical, and economical constraints; 
(d) keeping in mind the long-term perspective of supplying food to satisfy a growing 
and increasingly diversified demand, so that there is likely a future for diversified 
organizational arrangements and strategies in agriculture. 
Some contributions to the symposium suggested that a solution could be a policy-mix, 
combining private, administrative, and judicial modalities of monitoring and enforcement 
(Cafaggi and Iamiceli, 2017b). A recent Communication of the European Commission seems 
to make a step in this direction when noting that ‘The Green Paper consultation, 
accompanying studies and some of the most recent national initiatives suggest that a ‘mixed 
approach’, i.e. voluntary schemes complemented with credible and effective enforcement 
based on comparable principles, may be appropriate in addressing UTPs.’ (EC, 2014b: 13). 
An alternative could be reactivating the ‘Tinbergen principle’ according to which different 
targets command different policy instruments, for example with respect to food supply 
chain choosing instruments aligned with the specificities of different subsectors, e.g., fresh 
products vs storable ones; etc. 
In all cases, this is to admit that there is no one-size-fits-all solution and that some flexibility 
is in order. However, saying so also carries its own risk, the risk that policies fall into 
arbitrary measures, tailored according to specific interests. 
Bruno Buffaria suggested that a reasonable solution might be a ‘test and try’ approach. In 
that respect, the European Union may offer a unique opportunity, thanks to its diversity. 
Swinnen and Vandevelde provided an interesting typology of the various regulations 
implemented by the different member-states of the EU. This diversity may allow developing 
a comparative approach to the costs and benefits of alternative solutions. However, this 
diversity has also its limits. As noted by Cafaggi and Iamiceli (2017a,b), monitoring UTPs 
must also take into account the increasingly transnational nature of supply chain systems in 
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Europe. Assessing rigorously the existing practices and how they adapt to this evolution 
should be a priority. 
Many questions remain open which is no surprise. Among them: (1) What diversity is 
acceptable/manageable among Member States? (2) What status is desirable and 
implementable for small farmers in the long run? (3) How to maintain competing conditions 
at the organisational level? (4) What economic standards regarding agricultural practices 
and products can be compatible with social norms as diversified as those prevailing in the 
complex configuration of the European Union? 
Clearly there is an open debate on these issues that perspire in the difficulty to reach clear-
cut conclusions, particularly with respect to policy recommendations. Nevertheless, this 
symposium has shown that policy-makers do not start from scratch, that they can already 
benefit from some accumulated knowledge, and that there are relatively well-defined paths 
to be explored in order to find more suitable answers to the many challenges of unfair 
trading practices in food supply chain systems. 
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